UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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ARMED FORCES EPIDEMIOLOGIC BOARD

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MEETING

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WEDNESDAY

SEPTEMBER 13, 2000

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The Board met at 7:45 a.m. in the Executive Board Room of Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 503 Robert Grant Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland, Dr. F. Marc LaForce, President, presiding.

PRESENT:

DR.	LAFORCE	President
DR.	ALEXANDER	Member
DR.	ATKINS	Member
DR.	BERG	Member
DR.	GARDNER	Member
DR.	HAYWOOD	Member
DR.	LANDRIGAN	Member
DR.	MUSIC	Member
DR.	OSTROFF	Member
DR.	SOKAS	Member
COL	. DINIEGA	Executive Secretary

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE OFFICERS:

MAJ BALOUGH
CDR LUDWIG
LTC RIDDLE
CAPT SCHOR
COL WITHERS

AFEB LIAISON:

LTC NEVILLE DR. WOODWARD

A - G - E - N - D - A

WELCOME	4
Dr. LaForce	
ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS	4
WELCOME/WRAIR PM BRIEF	16
DISEASE AND NONBATTLE INJURIES (DNBI) DURING THE KOREAN WAR	29
COMMENTS ON THE AFEB	48
SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS	68
EXECUTIVE SESSION	L70

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(7:55 a.m.)

DR. LAFORCE: Let's get started. We will begin with some administrative remarks from Ben.

COL. DINIEGA: Okay. Good morning and welcome to the second day. Board members, don't forget your travel settlement. Fill that in when you get back home. Send it in and I'll review it. Remember, you need receipts for anything over \$75.00, I think -- other than your airline ticket. So if your taxi costs over \$75.00, you need a receipt on a single trip. Don't add them all up. There has been a couple that have submitted over \$100.00 taxi bills. Your calendars for nonavailable dates -- we'd like to have the next meeting in the February time frame.

Colonel Neville, when you see Dana, the group that got together would really like Hickam to be considered. Hickam Air Force Base -- since the Air Force is going to host, they really would like it. I didn't twist their arms. I had nothing to do with that. Sign-in sheets, outside. You have to sign in for each day so we know who was here.

On the agenda, we have three briefings.

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One is an overview of WRAIR Preventive Medicine. Personally, I would like to say that WRAIR Preventive Medicine and the Board has had historical, longstanding association. And Miller, who now runs the Medical Follow-up Agency, when I used to work for him in the mid-1980's and Colonel Ernie Takafukia used to be there too and at one time Linda was there, we used to regularly host the meetings on behalf of the WRAIR Command in the old War Room. And what a fabulous place and historical place, with many, many touch decisions and recommendations being made.

And since then, the Division of Preventive Medicine and Preventive Medicine in the Army has really changed. So we will hear what the Division of Preventive Medicine is about this morning.

And then Dr. Dale Smith, who I think isn't here yet, will give the talk on DNBI during the Korean War.

And then Dr. Woodward -- and the question was raised to me, did he maybe go to the old WRAIR. And I said, maybe, but we did send him maps to the new WRAIR. And I am not too sure that Dr. LaForce mentioned it is at the new WRAIR when

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you talked to him.

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DR. LAFORCE: But I knew we were sending a map.

COL. DINIEGA: Oh, we sent a map and a formal letter $\circ f$ invite. So Т think he will eventually get here. And then we are due for subcommittee members. And with this many members, I will leave it up to Dr. LaForce whether or not you need to split up. We have the next two rooms out And it may be that people want together for a little bit and then come back and discuss all the issues together anyway.

Colonel Crumrine was very busy yesterday and didn't have much flexibility in his schedule But he is willing to give building for tours. tours, 15 to 20 minutes, for small groups any time So, first, is there anybody in that we want it. the room who wants to go on a tour of the new One, two, three, four, five, six. WRAIR? Okay, we are going to go into can do that. We Executive Session whenever the subcommittees are done with the work -- we will go to Executive Session. We can do it at that time or at the very end after it is Or we can do it after the last talk and all over. before we go into subcommittee. Whatever you think.

1	I would think that
2	DR. LAFORCE: I would propose that we
3	probably not break up into subcommittees. We are
4	really quite I mean, the groups is really quite
5	small especially with Rosie not being here. And
6	I would think that we should just simply stay
7	together and go through the agenda.
8	COL. DINIEGA: And then to the end.
9	DR. LAFORCE: You bet.
10	COL. DINIEGA: And then do the tour at
11	the end?
12	DR. LAFORCE: You bet.
13	COL. DINIEGA: I would say time will
14	permit. So, okay, we will do the tour again. Is
15	that good for everybody? Okay. So you have
16	DR. LAFORCE: Yes, I have got a couple
17	of things that I need to talk about.
18	COL. DINIEGA: Okay.
19	DR. LAFORCE: There is an administrative
20	problem that has arisen that has to do with Stan
21	Music and Ted Tsai. It is my sad duty to say that
22	this will be Stan Music's last meeting with the
23	AFEB. There has been, over the last I guess two or
24	three months a request from a pharmaceutical

company that I will not mention -- with the request

position that because Stan has а with pharmaceutical company at the present time and so does Ted, that there was a supposition that all pharmaceutical companies should have representation at the AFEB. We tried to point out that Stan's appointment and Ted's appointment to the Board long anti-dated any relationship that either had with pharmaceutical companies. Nonetheless, it was the -- I would say -- decision by legal staff advising the AFEB that the AFEB follow what is called an all-or-none rule. And the all-or-none rule is that individual serve the Board with formal no on relationships with a pharmaceutical company or all would participate in some way, shape or fashion.

So with that rather grim alternative in mind, both Stan and Ted will resign from the Board.

And Stan has asked to say a few words to the Board. Stan?

DR. MUSIC: This is a little awkward because this has been a great pleasure and I have enjoyed working with a lot of people. Marc, you are exactly right, I was Chief of Occupational and Environmental Epidemiology for North Carolina when I was appointed to the Board, and I stayed with that and stayed away from vaccine issues and

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vaccine policy. No one at Merck asked me for a report and nobody knew what I did and when I was doing AFEB business, it was on my own and I am very proud of what we have been able to accomplish and grateful for the collegiality and the advances we have made.

But I understand the situation and there is nothing that anybody is going to be able to do about it. Thinking about this Board and how it functions, and we will hear from my old professor of medicine at Maryland, Ted Woodward, later about the Board and his perspective.

The Board has been reconfigured to the point where it is very different from its original configuration, where it had commissions that had lots of money and that funded a great deal of seminal research in many areas. We are now purely advisory.

But when I compare this Board and its function and how its advisory notices or recommendations are made public to another advisory board with which I am also an also a provider, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices to CDC and the Public Health Service, I find some things there that I would just bring to your attention

because I think they are meritorious. Not necessarily to be directly or completely emulated, but they have some bells and whistles that I think we would benefit from.

The Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices is appointed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and there is a formal venting And the debates are spent on ideas. There is a lot of principle and discussion that goes around and very little real wordsmithing. The wordsmithing that is done after they pass resolution is done in a committee with staff from CDC from the relevant part of the Public Health Service and a subcommittee from the Board itself. So that the final recommendations are crafted thoughtfully with lots of time and none of the press of an existing meeting and people waiting to get on airplanes.

The advisory nature is one that is taken seriously, but none of the advice that the ACIP gives to the Public Health Service is accepted until it is formally published as a supplement to the MMWR, and then those words that have been carefully wordsmithed and agreed upon are the official recommendation. If a recommendation falls

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short and the Public Health Service sees it doesn't want to do it, nothing happens. There is no publication. The recommendation is on the public record as part of a public meeting, but there is no publication. And there is none of the problems that we seem to have in this Board of revisiting an issue and going on the record time and time again, only to have what apparently is our advice falling on somewhat deaf ears.

think that this mechanism or variation of it is something that would give this Board a lot more visibility. Maybe having the recommendations published in Military Medicine or other official journal would some be think the idea of having useful, and I these recommendations get a lot wider circulation than they currently do in the form of a memo that is three star is probably more signed by a two or beneficial in the long would run and make recruiting for this Board as well as the advice the Board gives much more visible medical pieces of DoD than is currently present.

That is really all I wanted to say because I think the work of this Board is very important and I have worked hard with lots of good

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1 colleagues whom I will miss. And I want to leave 2 this advice or thoughts with you because I think it 3 useful to you. And I want 4 everybody. 5 DR. LAFORCE: What I forgot to mention 6 also for those of you that remember, Stan led the 7 Board review of the squalene issue, which 8 handled very deftly. And the Board wants to thank 9 you for not only the advice --DR. MUSIC: I had a lot of help. 10 11 DR. LAFORCE: Well, Elizabeth, sure a 12 lot of help. But there has to be somebody who leads 13 it. Yes? 14 I think there are two DR. ALEXANDER: 15 issues that you bring up that merit discussion and 16 they are really separate. One is the industry 17 issue and the other is what can we do to be more efficacious as a Board. I am not sure which one to 18 deal with first. 19 20 The industry issue has me troubled for a 21 number of reasons. At the macro level, when we 22 think about the issues that this Board must 23 address, the solutions lie in industry. Whether it 24 is something that DoD goes out and develops in

terms of its own technology and its interface with

industry, or whether the answer, whether it is a diagnostic, a therapeutic or a vaccine -- the answer or the solution for these infectious issues really lies with technology. And so to divorce ourselves and to put fire walls between us and industry to me represents very myopic thinking.

Now I know that we have to be careful to avoid any appearance of impropriety and to avoid any appearance of wrongful influence. On the other hand, I work closely with industry. I have learned that as a non-profit organization that there are ways to work with industry that are non-branded and that are non-contaminated. When you look at the diagram of interest that Venn we share common denominator issues and opportunities and that by working in partnership with industry in a way that particular product promote а interests can be served. And I think that is true for the military as well. It certainly works for CDC and NIH. We do so with great caution, great trepidation. We insulate things very carefully. Nonetheless, we have very strong partnerships with our federal agencies and industry our representatives.

Next week, in fact, Joel and Kelley will

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be there. We have a partnership with the seven pharmaceutical giants, one of which is Merck, where we are coming together to work on shared interest about STDs. We have to educate the public. We have to educate providers. We have to help policy understand the issues with reimbursement issues. We have to ensure access and equality of care for all people who are infected. shared interests. They are not brand specific. is not a particular drug. It is not a particular diagnostic. But together, working as a team, we can serve a public health mission.

So I am really concerned about what is happening to you, Stan. I don't feel comfortable with it because I think it thwarts the very activity that this group is trying to do to seek resolution to problems. I don't know if I am out in left field. That I have just become a civilian and I have lost my military bearings. But it just doesn't feel right to me that we as a group, the AFEB, can't have some relationship with industry.

I don't understand that.

COL. DINIEGA: I think there is still an open relationship with industry in that for example yesterday we had several pharmaceutical

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representatives and they routinely try to come to the meetings. It is an open meeting. So their presence at the meeting is not an issue. The issue was being a member of the Board, which happened by happenstance because people moved on to different jobs.

Ben, just to follow Stan's DR. GARDNER: line of the analogy. One of the very interesting and I think helpful things that the ACIP does is it has its group of voting members. But then it has group, equally large -- actually perhaps little larger of liaison members, even ___ including a group representing -there pharmaceutical organization and they have designated hitter who represents industry issues in general and that rotates among different industry leaders. There is other groups -- I know Pete Patrick is --

DR. MUSIC: These are resources for the ACIP, but they are not voting members.

DR. GARDNER: That is right. So one could consider -- I mean a way to have industry input and collegiality would be to have a set of formal liaison members to our Board that would represent -- that would ensure that. And it would

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make things up front too and specific.

COL. DINIEGA: That could be done too.

But you know each of the pharmaceutical companies have somebody who is in charge of military or do the affairs and interest for marketing. And they routinely -- they can attest to it -- they routinely stop by to see the Executive Secretary and also the preventive medicine officers and each of the surgeons. And those are the people that I say avail themselves of the meeting on a regular basis.

DR. MUSIC: I am sure it works but --

COL. DINIEGA: And then to formally -you see, one of the options was to formalize
pharmaceutical recommendations of the Board and the
discussion floated to the major pharmaceutical
companies. We also have all the little tiny ones,
and the question is how do you leave out anybody.

DR. MUSIC: With all due respect, Ben, the pharmaceutical representatives are on the sales and marketing side. They are not at the policy level and they are not at the science level and we need to be aware of that distinction. And I would say that the whole federal government is still struggling with this.

will just leave you with а quick I was notified yesterday that at anecdote. there was a telephone conference between my boss at Merck and somebody in CBER in the FDA, where CBER was telling us what was going to appear in today's JAMA, which is their analysis of the last five years of data on our varicella vaccine. We have the only licensed varicella vaccine, and they are publishing an analysis without even a courtesy to tell us what they have discovered prior to it going into print, which makes no sense and makes mockery of collegiality. So we are still struggling with this on many fronts.

DR. LAFORCE: I would propose that -let's come back to this in Executive Session and
move on to the agenda items. The first speaker this
morning is Major Pavlin for Colonel Kelley to
describe the WRAIR briefing. Good morning.

MAJ PAVLIN: Good morning. Good to see all of you again. Welcome again to Walter Reed Institute of Research. You know who I am, and I am filling in for Colonel Kelley. He says in his little notes here that he is in Indonesia this week. The truth is, yes, he is in Indonesia. He is in Bali this week, and I offered to change places

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with him, but he wasn't taking me up on that offer. So here I am.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We are jealous.

MAJ PAVLIN: I know. I know. A whole week in Bali. And then I think he has got to go off to the Caribbean a few times later this month and he just got back from the Caribbean. So it is that end of the fiscal year travel cycle, use it all up before September 30. So he is gone for about a month.

So he wanted -- he wrote down a few notes for me, so I will follow along with those. And you have in your handout some of his slides. The Division of Preventive Medicine has a history of contributions to the Army, and the most significant being that more than half οf all current Army preventive medicines have been trained That not only here in their residency program. includes Army, but beginning in 1980 Navy and Air Some of their key preventive medicine Force. leaders have been trained here, and that includes the current Navy PM consultant. I didn't Captain Gray. I guess he didn't come yesterday?

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MAJ PAVLIN: He was here. He also trained here at Walter Reed. And now our Coast Guard preventive medicine consultant is also a graduate of the Walter Reed Program. So we have managed to get our tentacles in a lot of different places.

Virtually all the preventive medicine officers that have ever served at the overseas labs also have trained here. So it is a source for that. So obviously we need a good strong base here to maintain that.

Next slide please. Because of that residency training, we really take our mission very seriously here. This is the mission statement and it is in your notes. And it emphasizes the fact that we are not only an asset to the Army, but we have programs that benefit the entire DoD. And with respect to the presidential mandate on emerging infections, which I will talk about a little bit later, we have a real formal role to fill on a unique national lead.

The staff here -- Colonel Kelley has been able to get some very good people here on his staff to assist in the residency training. On his staff are three former residency directors. So

their experience totals 25 years in directing the residency programs -- different residency programs. residency Colonel Prados the director was Madigan. Colonel Gaydos, I believe you must be the person he is referring to as residency You did that for some time. And Colonel director. Kelley himself was a residency director here. they have a lot of achievements. He also noted that Gaydos had received the prestigious Award for outstanding military academic leadership. So our people are well represented.

The next slide, please. We have been able to establish a broad base of support over the last few years. We all know that money is tight. So we work with a lot of different organizations. You probably know when CHPPM stood up about four years ago, a lot of our operational medicine assets and missions went over to the CHPPM, but the residency could not leave because they didn't have some of the operational base to keep that accredited if it was moved to the CHPPM. So the residency stayed here, but a lot of the assets went to CHPPM. was a little bit of a tough time. But I think that the training base now has stabilized and this past year WRAIR residency was able to get a flawless

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reaccreditation when the ROC had put over 40 percent of the civilian preventive medicine programs on probation. This went through with no even recommendation for change at all. So fully accredited for five years.

Next slide please. Take a close look at this one. I realized going through the notes this morning that he didn't update some of those people. So Lieutenant Colonel Dave Niebuhr is here now and on some of the other slides it says it is vacant. And the CHPPM detachment for the residency. These are the residency and assistant residency directors that are currently here now. So remember this slide.

There is three functional areas under the Office of the Director for the Division of Colonel Kelley not only is Preventive Medicine. the director, but he also has some special projects he is working on. One which should be coming to a close of this year is he is at the end specialty editor for the Bordon Institutes Textbook of Military Medicine Volume entitled Preventive Medicine, Mobilization and Deployment. And this textbook features over 120 authors with over 150 reviewers. So it is going to be a two volume --

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the first two volume textbook of military medicine Hopefully we will see this on the coming out. street next year. It has got seven major sections. preventive medicine history, covers and training, predeployment, mobilization postdeployment and deployment issues in operations It is over 90 percent complete other than war. now. So it has been a big work.

He also is the director of the DoD Global Emerging Infection System, and that is why he is in Indonesia. There is a meeting there to do some regional surveillance efforts through PACOM.

Next slide, please. The Department of Field Studies is what I am chief of, and I also serve -- mostly I work with the DoD Global Emerging Infections Program, since the missions of those two overlap quite a bit. I don't -- you see I am the only person there. That is me. I have nobody else. So I don't have a lot of support staff to work different with. Ι work on issues with virus surveillance you heard about yesterday, some of the bioterrorism and rapid surveillance efforts heard about yesterday.

Here is some more background on GEIS.

Go ahead, next slide. GEIS was -- now how many

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people have heard about GEIS? You probably got a briefing before. Okay. So you've got that. You have got the annual reports, I won't read all this. But 1996 started up in as а Presidential was Decision Directive to work with emerging infection surveillance and to increase a lot of our defenses recommended after the Institute of Medicine study that we really need to promote and preserve some of DoD overseas assets, including the overseas labs.

Next slide. This is the -- kind of the abridged version of how we got here. You can read through that. We do have an oversight board that is chaired at the DoD health affairs level with flag representation from each of the Services, from DDRNE and the Joint Staff.

Next slide. This is our budget for GEIS. We are funded from the Defense Health Program in P8 dollars. As know, the Defense Health you Program is very short with tri-care issues. So it is significant that they have given us this much. We have gotten a total of about \$54 million through fiscal year 2005. But most of this, we are directed to spend at least 65 percent of this in support οf the five Army and Navy

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laboratories. So most of that goes directly to those overseas labs as you can see.

We do kind of leverage this as much as we can with other funds. Colonel Kelley has been able to receive over \$400,000 from South COM to do a humanitarian assistance project down in the Caribbean.

This is our functional Next slide. Dr. Gaydos, that is you and that is me. chart. Just remember that. The organization here -- it is constantly in a flux. But this is the current one. Captain Davis assists Colonel Kelley with the Deputy Director job there and works with him on developing a lot of -- especially on the CONUS aspects of what we do in GEIS. Mr. Jim Writer, who share an office with, works as Director of Relations, and External mostly respect to the CINCS and some of their engagement exercises that we are trying to work with them.

Colonel Kelley also serves as the cochairman, I believe with Dr. Ostroff with the
subcommittee of the task force on the Office of
Science and Technology policy. So he works on that
level. And we have some major partners that
include the CDC, the State Department, NASA, NOAH,

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USAID and the FDA.

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Next slide. I don't have much time to go into all the different GEIS projects, but they are summarized here. You should have all gotten one of the strategic plans or at least one of the annual reports I have seen float around so you have an idea of what is going on there. Dr. Phil Brockman of Emory University is now chairing an Institute of Medicine review of all the overseas laboratory programs and the CONUS programs. So we will be getting the results of that within a year.

slide. That is fine. The Next Department οf Epidemiology is headed by Colonel Krauss. The primary center -- what they do here in the Department of Epidemiology -- and again, she is now assisted by Colonel Dave Niebuhr, who has just arrived -- is the AMSARA, which is the Accession Medical Standards Analysis on Research Activity. This was established about two-and-a-half years ago provide evidential basis for accession It has a whole list of names here. standards. working group responds to the Accession Medical Standards Steering Committee which is co-chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy and the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Clinical Program Review. We know that about 35 percent or so of recruits that come in have premature attrition. And with the high healthcare costs associated with that of and also treating them if thev training have preexisting medical conditions is seen by the GAO as being very important. The P8 funding for this department is about \$525,000.00, and most of that is used to support our in-house contractor staff. Tim Powers is in the back there if you have any questions on AMSARA. He is here. He is one of our contractors on that program.

These are the objectives of Next slide. example, to validate current AMSARA. For proposed standards such as should flat feet -- and I believe they have determined no that flat feet should not be disqualifying. These are things that are historical that have just been there forever that this is a disqualifier. So they have changed То validate assessment techniques that. and determine that the current screening tools that are currently in use actually have a good predictive value. And also to do some quality assurance to sure that, for example, some of the stations the military entrance processing

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stations -might vary in the frequency of diagnosing certain types of conditions, but then the level of attrition from these different areas isn't any different. So we notice they are missing some of these, but yet it is not seeming to affect what soldiers drop out or what ones don't. So that is important as well. And the bottom line is to impact and recommend changes to any policy if they should so-warrant. And I believe they have already done that in quite a few instances.

Next slide. There is a whole bunch of information that I certainly won't go through right now. But in the back we have a box of these -- Tim has got them there. It is over to the other side, Colonel Diniega. If anybody is interested, this is one of the annual reports from 1999. They go through much of what they have found and you are welcome to take one of those with you.

Colonel Krauss also has a lot of other activities in her department including an NCI funded program project grant with Harvard and Johns Hopkins to study serologic precursors in military populations for Hodgkin's disease. And also an analysis of Hepatitis C screening in the military as well as assisting with many of the residency

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projects. She is also working on a rapid, simple and cheap dipstick assay for measles, mumps and rubella. So hopefully we can stop immunizing people that are already immune and we can save some money on that.

And last, again this is Next slide. Lieutenant Colonel Lisa Keep is Colonel Lisa Keep. now the Residency Director assisted by Major Bob They are actually assigned to CHPPM as well. They have an instruction system specialist and a they secretary, but are located here in his The residency, again as I have said, has been fully accredited for five years. Currently there are four Army residents. They are in the back corner there of the room, plus one recently graduated resident, as well as one Navy resident who is not here right now. The residency brochure I believe is in the back of the room and you are welcome to pick up copies of those.

Next slide. Major Bob Mott, who I mentioned, is also the Deputy Residency Director. He also co-directs the Military Tropical Medicine Course and the Army Force Protection Conference. So he keeps very busy.

To assist in the audience, Dr. Gaydos

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1	knows a lot about especially the military health
2	side of the DoD GEIS program and Tim Powers from
3	AMSARA. So if you have any questions, feel free to
4	ask any of us. That concludes my briefing. Any
5	questions?
6	DR. LAFORCE: Thank you. Questions?
7	May I ask what the budget is?
8	MAJ PAVLIN: I don't know. I am not
9	privy to that information. I really don't. Dr.
L O	Gaydos, do you know?
L1	DR. LAFORCE: I am sorry I asked.
L2	DR. GAYDOS: I think we are running
L 3	about \$10 million or \$11 million right now.
L 4	DR. LAFORCE: For GEIS.
L 5	DR. GAYDOS: For GEIS.
L 6	MAJ PAVLIN: Oh, for GEIS. I am sorry,
L 7	for GEIS.
L 8	DR. LAFORCE: Yes, that is what I meant.
L 9	MAJ PAVLIN: For GEIS it is is it
20	that much? \$8 million?
21	DR. GAYDOS: We are on a ramp and I
22	think right now we are about \$10 million.
23	MAJ PAVLIN: It goes up about a million
24	a year. I thought it was more like \$8 million.
25	Where is that slide?

DR. LAFORCE: I just noticed you had it
on one of the slides.

MAJ PAVLIN: Yes, it was about \$7

MAJ PAVLIN: Yes, it was about \$7 million this year.

DR. GAYDOS: It is about \$8 million.

MAJ PAVLIN: Yes, we are expecting \$8 million for next fiscal year.

DR. LAFORCE: Other questions for Major Pavlin?

I just want to make a COL. DINIEGA: comment. As far as physician training in preventive medicine and occupational medicine, there are other places that do training. USU, the Uniformed preventive medicine Services, has а residency occupational medicine program and an residency that is where the old And Army occupational medicine program was moved to. now all at USU. And then the Air Force runs an aerospace medicine program, which is I think biavails themselves of the service. The Army residency as well as the Air Force. And I think the Navy go somewhere else. But those are some of the other training programs. And each of the Services has their own preventive medicine agency per se. The CHPPM being the one for the Army, whatever the

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name $\circ f$ t.he week is for the Air Force the Office of Prevention AERA/OPHSA, Health Services Assessment -- and then the Navy is NEHC, Navy Environmental Health Centers.

DR. LAFORCE: All right. Thank you.

Let's go on to the next presentation, Dr. Smith,

disease and non-battle injuries during the Korean

War. Dr. Smith is the Chair of Military History at

USUHS. And also welcome to Dr. Woodward.

DR. SMITH: For some of you it will be review. For some of you it will be memory. some of you it will be history. In 1945 in April, United States succeeded in creating international body called the United Nations to assure that we would not have to go through the trauma of war on a global scale another time. There was a conference that winter in Yalta, where the big three -- Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin -sketched out with a certain amount of ambiguity the resolution of world affairs at the close of the war.

The United States was at the same time developing an atomic weapon which we would use on the 8th of August and bring the war to a conclusion. The Soviet Union entered the war

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against Japan on the 9th of August, moved into Manchuria and Northern Korea. And in the conclusion of the Second World War, the Korean Peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel by a Soviet zone of influence in the north and a U.S. occupied zone in the south.

1946, the United States and In the negotiated a withdrawal from Soviet Union Korean Peninsula, and in Europe a variety of political Communist movements in Western Eastern countries undertook to change the forms of government in those countries.

The Communist parties in the west were for the most part contained by democratic activity. In Greece, there was a civil war. The British were supporting the democratic element there and couldn't afford it.

In 1947, President Truman issued the Truman Doctrine that we would work to contain the spread of Communism. We saw by 1947 the Communists under the influence of the Soviet Union rapidly spreading their, we thought, pernicious system to the world.

In 1948, we would see further tensions in Europe. Eastern countries would not have

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democratic elections. We would continue to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula.

In 1949, we completed our withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula in June. In the fall, the Soviets exploded their atomic weapon and we were in the midst of a growing period of tension.

From the Soviet point of view, their leader and Defense Minister, Joseph Stalin, had visited an American military cemetery in Murmansk. He knew in his heart of hearts that Americans were out to destroy the Soviet Union. He saw evidence of this in the failure to open a Western front as early as he thought the allies should have. And in the post-war world, he set up a program of creating a set of buffer states to prevent the Soviet Union from being invaded again by a stronger economic and military power.

In the Berlin Blockade, Truman let it be known that atomic weapons were based in England with the target of Leningrad and Moscow. Stalin could not maintain the blockade against that threat, but pushed harder to get his own weapon. And in 1949, he did.

When this Cold War tension began to draw lines, the United States Secretary of State in

January of 1950 laid out American spheres of influence where aggression by Communism would be met with force if necessary. Unfortunately, went through the Korean Strait. inadvertently, mostly because many people believed he had never heard of Korea and didn't even know we had had troops there six months earlier, Korea was The North Koreans, Communists left out. Nationalists, negotiated with Stalin and with the Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung to return to battle tested Korean divisions that had been serving with Mao and to get Soviet tanks. And in June, they came south and overran the Republic of South Korea.

Let's move to the next slide. In a two-pronged attack, taking Seoul and then coming down the valley you see in the center, they pushed south and American military assistance groups and civilians fled.

The third slide, please. General proconsul for Japan, decided MacArthur, the consultation with national command authority that this invasion should be resisted. And so -- the next slide -- he sent a task force of slightly larger than regiment size on the assumption that the simple sight of well-trained American troops

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would cause this Asian invasion, three corps in strength, to turn back. General MacArthur was capable of self-delusion. Task Force Smith encountered the North Koreans and fell apart.

In part, they were overwhelmed and in part they were simply outnumbered and in part they were poorly prepared. We had drawn down our Army at an exponential rate and there were not sufficient forces in the area.

Next slide, please. Wе deployed hospitals in support of this activity and other troops would follow. The new MASH, a combination of the Auxiliary Surgical Hospital of the European Theater and the portable surgical hospital of the Pacific, provided South support. Battalion surgeons couldn't move the men to these hospitals, as we fell back so fast we passed the chain of evacuation.

Next slide, please. We were pushed back into a parameter around Pusan -- next slide, please -- and the Commander, General Walker, of the 8th Army, had the privilege of giving an order seldom given in American military annals. He ordered his men to die in place. Such was the situation. The Marines had two uncommitted divisions. They were

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both understrength by stripping out the second division and adding it to the first division. They The first battalions were offered to MacArthur. went in to Pusan to strengthen the line -- next slide please -- and the others invaded at Inchan. In September, we broke out of the Pusan parameter next slide -- moved north rapidly, the North Koreans taken in the flank and rear as well as in the front fell back. Next slide. We moved through Next slide. We began to move our medical resources into country. Wе stripped out residencies and began to move -- next slide -- into the north. And in this environment, we saw what were classified as the first and most extreme of our disease problems.

Next slide. Neuropsychiatric causalities, which while not exactly unrelated to battle were not wounds. And in the disasters of the early months, not surprisingly there was a phenomenal peak of neuropsychiatric causalities. After September with Albert Glass's arrival and division psychiatrists put in place, this began to stabilize because the lessens were well known from World War II.

Next slide, please. MacArthur continued

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to push north into North Korea. Next slide. As winter began to come on, he entered into an area that the Chinese had said they would defend. Next slide, please. In late November, both wings of the American advance were overwhelmed and went into, as the Marine General Commanding said, attacking in a different direction.

Next slide, please. In this retreat and disaster, cold injury would create phenomenal problems during that first winter. You will notice the three winters compared on this slide. The first winter where we had no gear, we had learned the problems in 1945 and the Army Quartermaster, quite frankly, was working very hard on developing contracts to solve the problem. But as frequently is the case, the system was overtaken by events.

Next slide, please. The line fought tenaciously in the South and back began to stabilize just south of Seoul. Next slide, please. The problems of evacuation and surgical treatment brought first efforts. Surgeons were deployed in a consulting fashion. Next slide, please. General Ridgeway ordered a stop -- next slide -- and an attack back into the north. And a line not too different from the original line began to stabilize

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by the spring of 1961.

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slide, please. Next There were phenomenal numbers of refugees. Next slide. The sanitary conditions of the Korean people had not been great before. Next slide. Our medical resources, while stressed, now were beginning to Next slide, please. We went into trench catch up. warfare very similar to World War I -- fox holes and trenches -- next slide -- but in a terrain that was considerably more unforgiving.

Next slide. The situation through Korean War -- notice the initial assaults, the removing to the North, and then occasional assaults and negotiations of position along the trench lines give you the humps of battle casualties. The disease, while eventually coming down, will never the rate of battle casualties. fall The causalities fall way down and seldom get above disease. And non-battle injury, while coming up occasionally with assaults, maintains stability throughout the war.

Next slide, please. This situation of altitude and cold and other environmental situations gave rise to considerable non-battle injury. Simply moving about in that kind of

terrain was hazardous combined with the problems of cold injury gave you a serious non-battle injury potential, and one we had never much grappled with. There had always been some concern with safety. Nobody wanted anybody to get hurt, but training and activity in the military is vigorous and quite frankly there had always been disease problems as there were in Korea, but considerably overwhelmed the understanding of non-battle injury.

Next slide, please. The diseases were about what you'd expect. Carded for record only incidence of upper respiratory infections peaking in the winter -- next slide please -- diarrheal problems considerably greater than either the Far East Command or the Army as a whole, reflecting mostly contaminated water supplies and a certain inattention to detail in mess arrangements -- not unknown, really a problem for the non-commissioned officers and a discipline rather than military medical activity.

Next slide, please. As the war stabilized, no one in military medicine was overly surprised as the sexually transmitted disease rates went up, not quite exponentially but almost. Next slide, please. Malaria was known to be in parts of

the Korean Peninsula, but not really much feared. incidents in the first year, however, attention to a problem as we adopted a new policy. In 1951, following the Korean invasion, the draft was reinstituted. And in this reinstitution of the draft, concern about the Cold War Army began to And a decision was made to adopt a new policy used by some other countries with gun boat or small war activities in their past, usually colonial, of rotation. A point system was put in place, but essentially you stayed in theater a year and then you could go home, however long the war would last. As people on malaria suppressive drugs stopped taking their went home and malaria suppressive drugs, we relearned a lesson we had learned after Guadalcanal and Fiji ten earlier that the failure to treat the malaria after suppressive therapy will result in breakthrough. Next slide, please. And the Surgeon's General and the Armed Forces Epidemiology Board were called to investigate.

Alf Alving of Chicago was put in charge
-- next slide, please -- of evaluating a series of
new drugs with contracts from the Army and a series
of suppressive and therapeutic agents were

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evaluated to monitor their impact on malaria in the United States as a result of returning troops. And as primaquine came on line and was tested, terminal prophylaxis on ship was instituted as a result of these studies.

Next slide, please. Other kinds of problems that had been known before also occurred in Korea. Hepatitis, particularly early in the war, seemed to be epidemic. Again, food handling seems to be implicated. Next slide. Then Captain Thomas Chalmers -- next slide -- using the new understandings of carefully controlled prospective trials, designed a series of trials to evaluate dietary change and rest to determine what was most effective in allowing individuals to recover from hepatitis.

Next slide, please. Chalmers, working with this institution, then known as the Army Medical Graduate School, in cooperation with people in civilian institutions through the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, determined that you could ambulate people much earlier than previously thought, which in military medicine turned out to consideration and be an important helped compliance with any regimen being used.

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Next slide, please. Colonel Francis consultant in medicine Chief Pruitt, and of Medical Medicine at Walter Reed Army Center, reviewed the results of these activities after the war, and he noted that there were two areas in particular where the Army had had fears. They were unable to do anything early in the war simply for lack of trained resources. Pruitt noted that there were 66 medical officers in Japan to deploy and it took several months to strip people out of residency. Even with one or two years of internal medicine, they were more useful than people just out of internship. And slowly, he said, data began to be accumulated which could be trusted.

It was well known that Next slide. there then thought to be arbovirus was а encephalitis -- Japanese B encephalitis -- which in the 1920's had devastated Japan with a series of epidemics which was related to serologically and by reaction studies in animals other viral diseases. Remember, we are before Enders and culturing virus is done in eggs if it is done at all -- next slide, please -- and Japanese B encephalitis was predicted Dr. Albert Sabin had in 1950 to be a problem. worked on a killed vaccine during the Second World

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War and the Army Medical Graduate School had vaccine effort in the refined that inter-war period, and it had been given. It took three doses separated over time by an interval they thought of at least six months and preferably a year. And nobody knew whether it worked.

data began to come in, it became As clear to Colonel Pruitt that one of the things that had happened was vaccine records had not sufficiently kept. And in many divisions, they did not have any idea what percentage of the active force may or may not have been vaccinated. The 24th and the 25th Infantry, for example, were at least partially vaccinated, maybe as much as 40 percent, maybe as low as 20 percent. 60 percent of the people could not be found to have any vaccination immunization records all. at The Marines were known to be for sure not immunized as was the 27th British Brigade and the 5th Regimental So at least some effort could be made Combat Team. evaluate retrospectively the impacts vaccination if -- and it was a biq if -vaccinated divisions had been vaccinated Then they should have less Japanese successfully. encephalitis. The data were statistically

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ambiguous.

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Next slide, please. The tactical provided some partial situation opportunity to The unimmunized and the immunized seemed randomly distributed around the be Pusan parameter. Many soldiers were kind of randomly distributed around the Pusan parameter, and where 8th Army thought people were wasn't necessarily even where they were. So this data, even though it doesn't tell you anything for sure except being near rivers is probably worse for you than not, is ambiguous itself.

Next slide, please. And so Pruitt and his colleagues concluded that their data were at The best methods of control were best ambiquous. ineffective. They were mosquito control and that difficult to do in a war, particularly in a The demonstrated conclusiveness of retreat. effectiveness of the immunization regimen was at best a Scotch verdict of not proven. There was no effective therapy demonstrated. But the problem really didn't get as bad as they thought it would and they quite frankly didn't know why. But they were glad it hadn't. They discontinued the advice the Army Epidemiological Board --

Armed Forces Epidemiological Board use of the immunization and WRAIR was charged to build a better vaccine.

noted there had been Pruitt also Next slide, please. Thought to be surprise. leptospirosis initially, а new febrile disease known in the Korean and some Russian literature, a fever with renal complications to hemorrhagic follow-on called creatively Korean hemorrhagic etiology unknown, epidemiology unknown, outcome pretty lousy was noted. But it seemed to Epidemiological work was undertaken. taper out. Studies were begun. Data was collected. was examined. Efforts were made. And at conclusion of the war, it remained a problem to be solved, probably related to rodents, at least that is what the Koreans had suggested.

Next slide. What is clear from the experience is that the Army medical department was not in any serious way prepared for ground combat. This is not surprising. The Army prepared. The doctrine was we had an atomic weapon, there would be atomic wars, there would not be any The Air Force wanted all the money for more wars. toys and people were not needed. Is it

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history? Yes, well, the problem was that it didn't work out that way. And as the Army went to war, and medicine medicine and Navy following When the first Marine Marines struggled along. division went in, only the division surgeon had had World War II experience. It has only been five lessons of World War ΙI are not The years. This is not а question of lessons learned. Ιt is lessons known by the people who The thing that we discovered needed to know them. in Korea historically is that military rotational policies mean that the people who learn the lessons go on to other jobs. And so the new people who have learned the lessons and frequently are taught the lessons are discovering new things that have been discovered many times before.

One of the new things that needed to that discover pointed out they institute a way to solve was to collect prospective from the beginning and keep up with things like immunization status, so that you evaluate the data had using the you modern biostatistical techniques. This was considered by a variety of commissions and a variety of boards and a variety of very bright people. We still don't

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have a very good way to collect data prospectively from the beginning of a deployment. We are getting a little better. But Pruitt had it two months into Pruitt was concerned that nothing had been done about cold injury. Nothing had been done to that neuropsychiatric causalities managed from the beginning. It took three months for the consultants to get things up and running. took four months to get infectious disease specialists, first from the United States and into Japan and then to set up specialty hospitals in Korea for the hemorrhagic patients and other kinds of new problems.

finally, And since many οf these problems have been solved by immunization and since in the late 1960's the Surgeon General of United States declared that infectious disease is no longer a problem for American medicine, we have begun to do a very good job of keeping soldiers healthy from disease, much better than we did in We have begun in recent years to do a better job on accidents and non-battle injury. I would submit to you that just like Pruitt and Alving and Chalmers had to take apart the disease experience οf Korea in order to relearn the

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military medical lessons and to learn new lessons of medical science, we are now faced with a need to take apart non-battle injury. To differentiate its components into some sort of better nosography to follow. We still need to learn the lessons of the Korean War in real time prospective information. We are better, but they thought they were so much better than people had been in the past war too. And one lesson to always remember as you deliberate and as you advise, is that the people who will implement what you suggest, do not have the experience of the people who gave you the idea and told you it was doable. To make it so it will work, it has got to be soldier and sailor proof. good meeting.

DR. LAFORCE: Questions for Dr. Smith?

I have one. I was -- I didn't realize the extent of cold injury, and I was quickly looking through the rates. The rates during December/January began at 160 per 1000. That is 16 percent of the total force. And I assume they haven't rotated because the next month is about 140. So that means that you have got a 30 percent morbidity rate due to cold injury just over a two-month period of time. Is my interpretation correct?

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DR. SMITH: During that retreat in the regiments that were in battle, cold injury rates exceeded wounded in action rates and were in some regiments over 900 per 1,000 per year. A bad year, a bad military situation in a bad environment, and the result was a disaster.

DR. LAFORCE: Questions? Observations?

I suggest that we still have a lot to learn. Yes,
Phil?

One little link there, DR. LANDRIGEN: sort of a footnote on your epidemic graph of Korean hemorrhagic fever, has to do with the fact that the epidemic intelligence service at CDC, of which many of us are alumni, was established in the summer of 1951 by Alexander Langmuir who knew people like Chalmers. And his rationale, at least his rationale Capitol Hill for establishing the epidemic intelligence service was to create a cadre of people who would be deployed, at that time mainly within the U.S., to be an early warning for us to detect the introduction of fevers from the Orient as he used to refer to them. So it is interesting how these things ripple in other different directions as well as along the main line.

DR. SMITH: Most EIS officers would be

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offended to know they started as a bio-war early warning system.

DR. LAFORCE: Except that most ex-EIS officers know how deft Alexander Langmuir was in terms of getting Congressional support and money. So many of us wouldn't be so surprised. Okay, thank you very much, Dr. Smith.

Now it is a great pleasure to introduce -- really, no other word comes to mind other than Ted Woodward, who is not only a legend -- Dr. distinguished Chair of Medicine at the University of Maryland, but also a long, long affiliation with the Board and was a president of the Armed Forces Epidemiologic Board for many years. Ιt is pleasure to welcome Dr. Woodward. Dr. Woodward's presence here begins with a discussion -- again, you know we were talking about Stan's influence. Just over the short period of time, I remember the first time we got together, we were having dinner in Tijuana or somewhere. It was after the San Diego meetings and Stan pointed out that we had a legendary resource that was in the Washington area, Dr. Woodward, and that we ought to sort of work out you to come. invitation to get And delighted to see that that now has come full

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circle. Welcome, Dr. Woodward.

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DR. WOODWARD: Thank you. When you get old, is history and all you talk about grandchildren. I have got nine of those. Smith took my mind back talking about Korea. Because under the AFEB cloak, a team went out to Korea in 1951 -- Joe Smidel, Bob Traub, Barry Wood and a few others and helped straighten out some of the clinical manifestations of the late syndrome method of transmission. In as late as 1987, the Navy and the Army presented a Board a series of questions about what to do about Korean Colonel Smith also mentioned hemorrhagic fever. encephalitis, Japanese encephalitis. Under AFEB, educational movies were made on arthropodborne encephalitides and it is mainly about Japanese B encephalitis, and this is an excellent teaching film. The AFEB has also sponsored a film on hemorrhagic fever, and if you want to get in touch with it, you can get in touch with photographic department of the institution that we are now in.

Now the AFEB is a 60-year affectionate marriage between the military services, Army and Navy first, the Department of Defense and academic

medicine. And this is the 60th year -- the 60th year of that marriage. And I doubt whether there are many committees in Washington who have lasted that long.

call me on time, I have a reputation. I have written -- made a little sketch so I won't leave things out. Then I am going to show you some pretty pictures. The quality and productivity of any endeavor depends most of all upon the dedication and wisdom of those given the responsibility to carry out that mission. who conceived of the Medical Advisory Board to assist the Department of the Army were leaders with They understood the current vision. military perceived the medical problems and the health that would plaque the military in the matters Not only were there men like Blake and McCloud, able medical Bayne-Jones, scientists in their own right, but they also had uncanny insight and common sense.

The Armed Forces Epidemiologic Board was conceived 60 years ago as a medical and scientific advisory board to the Department of the Army. After World War II on advice of the Surgeon General, the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Army

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recommended that the AFEB be established as a triservice board. The new charter was formally adopted on 8 October 1953, with the Board serving as a joint agency for the three medical departments, and I have copies of all the charters back here if you would like to have them.

How many of you know that a history of the Armed Forces Board and its commissions was written? How many of you know that? That is good.

Are there any copies left, Colonel Diniega?

COL. DINIEGA: Yes, sir.

DR. WOODWARD: You do?

COL. DINIEGA: Yes, sir.

DR. WOODWARD: Really?

COL. DINIEGA: Yes.

DR. WOODWARD: I am surprised. Ι thought they were all gone. They tell the whole story, and I would say that history would not have been written if this Board hadn't kept meticulous minutes and if Jean Ward and Bob Wells and Nick Kolowski and many others hadn't kept excellent records in the AFEB office. And at this meeting, speakers were asked to present their comments briefly in writing. And if those records hadn't been available, I can tell you those two books

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would have not been possible.

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Throughout this history, the Board has needs of Services with responded to the the dedication, wisdom and sound advice. inception in 1940 through 1973, the Board developed and used commissions to study specific military medical problems. Commission investigators engaged basic and field investigations of problems relating to epidemiology and preventive medicine within the military medical community and they left their home offices and went to Panama and went to Vietnam and went to Korea and went over the United States whenever they were asked to do so under aegis of this splendid Board.

Called on during times of peace, the commissions responded willingly to the medical needs of women and men in uniform. Commission appointments combined with intramural research benefitted the general public health as well as the military and included the development of influenza vaccine in the treatment and prevention of pneumonia, hepatitis. When I in medical was hepatitis school, called acute catarrhal was You had an inflammation of the bile jaundice. That is what I was taught and I graduated in duct.

1938. Wе have come а long way, haven't Meningococcal meningitis, rheumatic fever, tetanus, Many leaders in diphtheria and so many others. American medicine, busy as they were, found time to contribute their capable services this t.o remarkable system. There unstinting urge to participate is attributable to their proud sense of privilege obligation and the οf serving Personal gain was not an objective. country. The opportunities to meet with and work with and argue with the leaders in infective diseases in other fields during the Board meetings, work sessions and small discussions were really mini post-graduate learning sessions. Almost everyone took away a new idea that answered a dead-end question or that illuminated a detour around a difficult obstacle. Information was willingly shared among civilian and military scientists.

The spring meetings of the AFEB and its working commissions usually lasted three days.

Those who attended these leading up to 1973 were privy to hear the most current data pertaining to pathogenesis therapy and control of the important infectious diseases that were prevalent both aboard and in the United States. Truly these three-day

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sessions were dress rehearsals for the later spring meetings of the American Society for Clinical Investigation and the Association of American Physicians usually held in Atlantic City in early May. The participating contributors were usually the same.

After 1973, when the commission system was abolished -- and I won't go into that, the Board assumed a new role and functioned under a new Indeed, during a short period in the midcharter. 1970's, the Board experienced a sinking spell that might well have led to its demise. Happily, the Board survived. Respect and pride were maintained and a good working relationship was reestablished among the three military services, the Department of Defense and the AFEB. Necessity also played a In addition to the new problems that arose such as the need to reevaluate the physical and safety standards of military in emergence of new environmental concerns, the old fashioned infectious diseases, such as we have heard -malaria, denque enteric diseases, Rift fever, venereal disease and tuberculosis never disappeared. Drug and alcohol abuse, obesity, high blood pressure, excessive smoking and heart attacks

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were always present. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome provided a whole new constellation of I remember that meeting -- 1985. meeting was over, Dr. LaForce, and there were no big problems to take home and I thought oh boy. And Colonel Herbold from the Air Force -- the meeting was over and I practically put the gavel He said, Dr. Woodward, what does the AFEB I said, you know, Colonel recommend about AIDS? Herbold, we do not act on verbal questions. in writing. They broke the record. Within 2 days with DoD and the military, we had the damndest questions you ever -- it ruined the whole damn summer. My God, because these were public meetings and there was the whole idea of gay rights and confidentiality. So first of all, the questions went to the AFEB. And then when they learned that there was a President in my office, the phone got red hot all during the summer.

So then the head of the gay rights movement, Dr. Robert Levy of New York, a lawyer, kept calling me. We were going to have a 2-day meeting and he wanted one day. And then there was another lady named Matilida Prim. She was an activist too and she kept calling. So I said, I

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will give you a half hour on the agenda. We have a
tight agenda. They wanted to bring about 25
representatives. I said, you can bring two. So
that was a very unrestful time. So I always
commute. That was a hell of a lot of traffic on the
beltway here, that is why I was late. Anyway, I
got here early that morning down in the War Room
where we met, and this had polarized the whole
WRAIR campus. Everybody was upset. My God, are we
going to have a war? We are going to have
everything. I got outside that room now listen,
I am not exaggerating and there were two
sergeants with all those stripes and they had two
side arms. Those were revolvers. And they were
there outside that damn door. I said, what are you
doing here? Well, we were told to come here by our
commander. I said, you get your ass off of here.
Can you imagine? The Washington Post, the New York
we had six newspaper representatives. You get
down on another floor. Could you imagine the
headlines there? The Army anyway, that is one of
the most important things I ever did before this
Board to say that right there.

The Board was asked to address its attention to these issues and many more. To the

interest and gratification of both its members and those military personnel with whom the Board was privileged to collaborate. I want to give you some good sound advice. Don't leave the meeting early. Members don't leave the meeting early. In 1979, we had a meeting in San Antonio, Texas, and I was running a department of medicine in a busy medical I went down there and I left that damn school. meeting early. I left it a half a day early to get to Baltimore. And those sons οf bitches elected me president. So you've got to be there. And that damn thing lasted 12 years -- 1980 to 1992, 12 years. And they are only supposed to serve for two years. So take my advice, you keep here and you stand up for your own. I don't regret it at all. It was one of the greatest privileges I have ever had.

So now let me show you some pictures of Now this is the old division the old days. Okay? of better the lights we turn down of preventive medicine. And there you see General Simmons and there you see Tommy Turner on the left. And there is Bayne-Jones and that is Bill Stone. Next slide, please. And here you see one of the early Board and here is Bayne-Jones. That is Dr.

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Avery. That is Ken Maxey. That is Joe Stokes. That is John Dingle. That is Colin, I think, and that is -- I believe Tommy Francis. I can't quite -- and that is Albert, I think.

Next slide, please. And here is a later Board showing Colin and showing Dr. Maxie. That is Horshall, Dingle, and that is Tommy and that is Dr. Next slide, please. And then that is Dr. Simmons, who was head of preventive medicine. really and Dr. Bayne-Jones were the ones who really founded this Board. Next slide, please. This is Dr. -- you see, that is what happens when you get You know as well as I know who this is. was at Yale. C'mon? Francis Blake -- of course, Dr. Blake. Don't get old. That is what happens to Next slide, please. memory. He was That is B.J. He taught me many wonderful man. things, including the necessity of keeping records.

Next slide, please. And here Dr. Blake and Dr. Maxie -- because we had a lot of scrub typhus in the Pacific War and it killed a lot of people. Sometime in there the death rate was 30 percent. And these two fellows left home and went out there. And this was the setting, this Kunai grass, where the mice survived in scrub typhus

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therapy. And they, with the Board, came up with the idea to burn the grass and get rid of the mice and put some stuff on the ground to kill the mice. Next slide, please. That was on the Board. here is the old respiratory commission and here is Rammel right here and here is Dr. Hauser right those the that is there. And were ones Wannamaker, I believe. But those were the ones that went out to the Air Force Base in Wyoming and they are the ones that came up with the prevention of rheumatic fever, as you know, with penicillin, which is one of the great contributions of the time.

Next slide, please. And they studied atypical pneumonia and so its transmission. There is a good picture of Colin and there is a good picture of Tommy Francis. Tommy was president of the Board for a long time. I succeeded Colin and also Tommy was the chairman of the Cole Study on Respiratory Diseases and Pneumonia. All you have to do is study World War I and you will find that a hell of a lot of people were put in the ground with influenza and with pneumonia.

Next slide, please. And then this is one of the great persons, Dr. Enders. And wasn't it

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wonderful that when they came to give him the Nobel Prize for growing the virus, he said thank you very much but I am not going to take it unless two people in my department get that too, and that was Tom Weller and Fred Robbins. How many people would do that? I can tell you a number that didn't.

Next slide, please. There is Tom Weller. He is still cooking, thank goodness. And these all served intensely. That is John Dingle, who practically built Western Reserve, but he was really the one that ran that acute respiratory commission with those wonderful that came up findings.

Next slide, please. That is Dr. Goodpastor, who -- oh, I remember him. He was a man of few words, but could he really give you information. He was a pathologist that ended up down at Vanderbilt, of course.

Next slide, please. He was one of the first fertile cultivate one to use eggs to bacteria. And K.F. Meyer, he was great raconteur, the world's authority on plague and on many diseases, including tularemia that we have heard about and including leptospirosis that we heard about.

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1 Next slide, please. That is Joe Stokes, 2 who practically built part of Philadelphia 3 taught us so much about vaccines and the theory of vaccines in combinations. You see, we had a whole 4 5 commission on immunization that developed and 6 purified vaccines. 7 Next slide, please. And then there is 8 Rammel, who was at Wesson Reserve and one of the 9 great leaders of streptococcal diseases in the 10 world. Next slide, please. And there 11 is 12 Wannamaker, who worked with that team and was equally effective. 13 14 Next slide please -all effective, 15 modest people. And who will forget Max and Ed Krauss and Bill Jordan. Bill Jordan lives not so 16 17 far from here and he is still cooking. 18 Next slide, please. All I had to do was 19 mention pneumonia and Max Finland and that will 20 bring back your memory. But he was very active with That is Martha Pittman and that is Dr. 21 the Board. 22 Heidelberger and that is Bill Jordan. 23 Next slide, please. And then here is 24 Krugman, who left Rochester and went out all over

the United States to California and found the

sulfonamide resistance of the meningococcus and also showed that you could use drugs to prevent meningococcal disease, which we are still using in school. But he just left his shop up in Rochester and all the snow they had up there to go around the country and help the Board and its commission.

Next slide, please. This is taken from This was at Fort Ord, I think. him. They went out and they had to shut down bases and so forth. Because when you took young people, mostly men, and them in crowded barracks, they shared other's organisms and each other's diseases. That what war does. Ιt collects a lot immunologic virgins and brings them together. How the realize many of us in room t.hat. the meningococcus killed more soldiers during World War II than any other microbe. More than malaria. The meningococcus -and it was Worth Daniels who worked on this Board that said meningococcus may subtly as to elude diagnosis attack so so rapidly as to outdistance treatment. That is accurate statement. Because the meningococcus, it became septicemic and hit your adrenal when glands and you went in shock, it didn't matter what you gave them. Most of the time you were dead and

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that was called the Waterhouse-Friderichsen Syndrome.

So a lot of these advances have been evolved, Dr. LaForce, from your Board. Next slide, that is Saul Krugman, please. And then Mr. Hepatitis. I told you when I -- we didn't even know about viruses when I was in medical school and he helped to set that. There were two kinds And just the other day -- next viruses. please -- I saw Maurice and he had a great deal to do. He did a lot of his original work at the old WRAIR and Joe Smidel was there with him. And he is now Mr. Current Hepatitis. You know what he has done at Merck and Company. But his basic work was done at WRAIR.

Next slide, please. In the early days, that is Bill Hammond, who put the pants on polio vaccine and he was in Pittsburgh. And he with Tommy Francis in the eves were the ones that showed that gamma globulin or immune globulin would prevent polio before Jonas came along with the vaccine.

Next slide, please. That is Gus Damon,

Dr. LaForce, who chaired the Board for a long time.

I think ten years. He was a wonderful

pathologist. And I was interested that the tick

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that transmits Lyme Disease was initially named after Gus, Ixodes Damonaea. Now they have changed the name.

Next slide, please. And then Cecil Watson in Minnesota, who was the world authority on porphyrins and things like that. He served on several commissions on the Board. Next slide, please. And there is Gus with his Board. I can't - I am on an angle. That is Bill and that is Floyd Denny and he was on that respiratory team. That is Colin. And maybe you can --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Gordon Nickeljohn.

DR. WOODWARD: There is Charlie Wissman back there. Anyway, next slide, please. There is a little later version of the Board. I believe that is Paul Dennison. My, what a wonderful man he was. And we did a survey of the whole health system and he spent a whole year and that report was just remarkable. Cardiovascular standards, blood pressure and weight, all of those things. Epidemiologic forecasting and so forth. He just had a meticulous, wonderful mind. That is Hershel Griffin, who served as a Board president for a while. I believe that is Bob Osh.

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Next slide, please. And then here you see Dr. Mayer, who is secretary -- a Secretary of Defense and a Secretary -- the Surgeon Generals came and participated in the meeting. That is Leonard Curlin. That is Lou Lectors. That is Norland Nelson.

Okay, next slide, please. And then a better picture of Paul Dennison. Next slide. He really more than anyone else along with Joe were responsible for getting the Board involved biologic warfare defense. We had a commission on epidemiologic survey, which really had its mind in And most of the work done at Detrick at USAMRID. USAMRID was under the auspices of the commission and epidemiologic survey, а polite name for biologic warfare defense energy that still exists. Rockefeller and I succeeded him of the commission and epidemiologic chairman survey.

Next slide, please. And then here are some of the military people again -- Dan Jones, Dan Crozier and Bill Tiger, who really ran the scientific program. And Colonel Randall, who came up with the VEE vaccine. In the 1970's, Venezuelan equine encephalitis was coming out of Venezuela

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into Latin and South America. Mosquito-transmitted, and it looked like the horses -- all the horses in the southern United States would be eradicated. There were some patients -- a few died. But Pops Randall at Detrick had developed the VEE vaccine, livina and attenuated, and then there stockpiles of it. Veterinarians went from Detrick down to the south and met with the veterinarians and the horses in the southern United States were immunized and saved and that was under AFEB auspices.

Next slide, please. And then here is Albert and there is Philip and there is Dr. John Paul. During the war, we were having trouble with sand fly fever, a meddlesome not fatal disease, and they went out to the Far East to help figure out some of the epidemiologic characteristics.

Next slide, please. There is a good picture of Albert, God bless him. You know, he was married a long time. I take pride in something -- married a long time and they never had children. I said, why in the hell don't you get away. She took a vacation to Europe and she didn't get pregnant. So tension must have something to do with it.

Next slide. Then that is Saul Krugman

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again -- no, that is Gordon Michaeljohn. He was Mr. Influenza. What happened is everybody sent their sera to Gordon in Denver and then he would analyze the serum because the flu virus could put on an extra nose or an extra eye, you know the H and N antigens, and then we would have a meeting or a telephone meeting and decide what was to go into the new influenza vaccine that year. That was based on Gordon's valuable data.

Next slide, please. Here is a picture of the Board meeting in the Board Room. That is Surgeon General Denning and that is General Taylor and that is Randall. This was on a drug abuse That was a tough meeting. meeting. This was around the time of the Vietnam war and the fellows got into cocaine and heroine and we had a big problem. So the Board took that on. The Board took that on. We called in psychiatrists and everybody else to educate us. We had joint meetings with the Veterans Administration and determined not what we would do if someone was addicted but the long-term coverage. And the Board was responsible for coordinating that activity. And we haven't solved it completely.

Next slide, please. That is a picture of

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my dear friend Joe Smidel, who did so much for many commissions -- rickettsial disease commission, immunization, helped purify the small pox vaccine.

Rockefeller graduated from Washington University in St. Louis. He lived in Bethesda.

That is Ken Gudner, who was head of microbiology at Jefferson, and he too was very important in the vaccine development program and a program against cholera and so forth. Because we had a commission on enteric diseases.

Next slide, please. Then that is Charlie Wissman, who first of all worked with Joe and went to Southwestern and worked with Smidel and worked on toxins and helped work out the whole pathogenesis and pathophysiology of rickettsial diseases. He came to Maryland and was head of our department of microbionics.

Next slide, please. Then there is a picture of Bud Dennison, who is retired and still living. He has done so much for surveillance. He too was a product of Walter Reed and of Smidel. And incidentally, when he ever turned in a report, it was letter perfect. And he had them in almost the next day.

That is Chester Keefer, who probably

trained some of you maybe. He was a very active participant and developed streptomycin and a lot of things -- penicillin.

And Ed Perlong of Baltimore, God bless him, who served with the Board and really was Mr. Sulfanilamide.

That is Bob Austrian, whom as you know with Dr. McCloud -- but he did it mostly himself -- developed a pneumococcal vaccine. Bob was active on commissions and he is now in Philadelphia retired.

Next slide, please. And that is Jeff Edsel, a Harvard graduate, who was chairman of the commission on immunization and had a very scholastic, fertile mind. He was based at WRAIR.

So can we have the lights, please? So that is a quick going over of the Board, Mr. Chairman, and some of its accomplishments. There were eight more slides to come and there was also a picture of the former executive secretaries and there was a picture of Jean Ward and of Jane Eldridge, who were the secretaries. But I just know that I am over time, and I thank you for not calling me down.

DR. LAFORCE: I think on that note we

1	will break for about 15 minutes and it will give us
2	a chance to chat with Dr. Woodward.
3	(Whereupon, at 9:36 a.m., off the record
4	until 10:00 a.m.)
5	DR. LAFORCE: Okay. Ben?
6	COL. DINIEGA: Sir, are we in
7	subcommittees?
8	DR. LAFORCE: We are. We are now in
9	subcommittee/executive session.
10	COL. DINIEGA: Well, do you want to do
11	the why don't we do the subcommittee business
12	and then go into executive session.
13	DR. LAFORCE: Super.
14	COL. DINIEGA: Because there was the new
15	question on microbial based cleaners and the
16	performance standards, and Rosie isn't here. And
17	then the other issue is if the Board chooses to
18	make any comments about the ongoing ergonomics
19	question. And I gave you the previous
20	recommendations, that they want to continually be
21	involved in either more updates and information.
22	She had some specific questions on her
23	presentations.
24	DR. LAFORCE: Right.
25	COL. DINIEGA: Which is not in writing.

Which as Dr. Woodward said, put it in writing. But it is an ongoing issue. So if you want to make comments then or if you want to say we will wait until the next meeting, that is fine. there were several other informational briefs that people have said they may want to But there is no obligation for the comments on. ones that aren't formal questions to say anything.

DR. LAFORCE: All right. I have five issues that came up that I thought that we needed to discuss. Not necessarily in subcommittee but One was the question that came up in together. terms of the microbial cleaners where the general suggestion that came from Rosie and others is that there is probably some expertise or some group that already has looked at this. And what we need to do is either identify that expertise from either EPA from OSHA. And I am not exactly sure how to take that next step. What I was going to try to do was work with Rosie and ask Rosemary to give us a hand in terms of phrasing an answer to particular question. Does that sound reasonable to the Board as a strategy that we could do? And then what happens is when I get that back from Rosemary, then I will just sort of circulate it around to all

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members of the Board like we have with other documents.

COL. DINIEGA: Well, Phil is here from -

DR. LANDRIGEN: Could you restate the question?

DR. LAFORCE: The question, Phil, Sure. is that we have been asked to answer or to provide advice, and the question relates to what about the microbes that are present in these commercially available cleaning solutions, that list not only the presence of enzymes but also the presence of microbes. And when we had the question and answer session that followed that particular presentation, it was clear -- or it seemed clear to me -- that no anything about what going knew was Certainly the presenters didn't, and there didn't seem to be any information that was provided to us in terms of the commercial information that gave me any sense of satisfaction that I knew what it was that we were talking about. So my sense was that I felt that the Board really couldn't give any sort of informed opinion and what it needed to do was to get referred back down one level to -- pardon me?

COL. DINIEGA: No, go ahead. I just have

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some comments after you are done.

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DR. LAFORCE: No, why don't you give your comments right now before I get blown out of the water.

COL. DINIEGA: No, I wouldn't do that to Okay, the specific thing that they want, and handout given out, is there was а the Environmental Health Center, the State, that has developed a draft set of criteria essential for the adequate health hazard evaluation of such products, which was enclosed. The NEHC requests review and comment from the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board regarding these criteria. That is the task. What the letter from the SG's office states is concur with the request of the Board to review and comment on the proposed criteria for the performance of a health of microbial hazard assessment cleaners.

DR. LAFORCE: Okay, fine.

COL. DINIEGA: So focus on the draft criteria. Now the general gist yesterday was they look good, it is a fine starting point. The other part of the discussion was there must be some agency out there that they have to run these things through before they can start selling it. That is

the second issue. And then just as a clarification Board members, the way most the of these cleaners and solvents, et cetera, are used at least that I know of in the Army is that they actually can go out and purchase anything they do except in certain settings. I know in hospital settings there is an approved list of some sort that you can only use those on the approved list. Now industrial operations -- let's see, Ben used to be at AMC, but at the headquarters level. I don't know what their know, how they go about deciding what solvents and cleaners and detergents to purchase.

DR. LAFORCE: Yes?

I think our comments ALEXANDER: really were in terms of who to send this to. are at two levels. One was the occupational health exposure, the NIOSH recommendation that Rosie made. My recommendation was at the individual consumer level, if there is consumer product safety а commission whose task it is to evaluate products that are on the market for the general public. And it would be interesting to see whether they have done their usual rigorous evaluation of these types of products and what they recommend to the John Doe consumer as well as the population-based purchase

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would be reflected in this sort οf work environment framework that was posed. But I think also want to echo that the rigor οf the questions that posed really quite were was impressive, and that would be a valuable framework to any referral agency if they had not already created an infrastructure for evaluation.

DR. LANDRIGEN: One thing that I will --I am sorry I missed that discussion yesterday. As I told you, I was downtown at HHS in the afternoon. But one -- there is actually a whole literature in the occupational medicine field on these enzyme It mostly was published in the 1970's in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine and the Scandinavian Journal $\circ f$ Work Environment and Health. They had some really severe problems with these enzymatic cleaners in Europe, to the extent that a lot of the European countries have banned their use. And the problems have been allergies and the factories where these some of asthma. In products were produced, they used e.coli, I think, that had certain enzymes in them. And there was like а 25 or 30 percent prevalence of asthma developed among people employed in the factory who were making these things. What I seem to recall is

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that people that have preexisting atopy, allergic 2 predisposition, were at higher risk. But even 3 people that had no past history of allergy or 4 eczema had a pretty good prevalence. 5 She is diseased now, but the grand old 6 British occupational epidemiologist 7 Newhouse, Molly Newhouse, was the person who did 8 most of the work on this. She was one of 9 instructors the year the CDC sent me to the London School of Hygiene. So I remember it really quite 10 11 vividly. Those papers are out there. I don't know 12 if the folks who presented this talk yesterday were It is sort of old literature and 13 aware of that. may predate Medline, but it was quite real at the 14 15 time. 16 DR. HAYWOOD: The question is did it lead to some procedures, regulations or standards 17 18 of some sort that have to be met? 19 DR. LANDRIGEN: I think it mostly led to That the stuff was so hot that --20 banning. Well, that is what I 21 DR. HAYWOOD: 22 meant. 23 DR. LANDRIGEN: They didn't need it. 24 But, Phil, do you know is DR. ATKINS: 25 our assumption true that there is some agency that

1	has jurisdiction over things that are non-chemical?
2	I mean, my concern is that these might be like the
3	food supplements where they have gotten sort of
4	through this loophole of being natural products
5	that aren't regulated. If they are not regulated,
6	then the company has no interest in collecting more
7	information. So they may not actually have any
8	more information to give to us about exactly the
9	chemical constituents because there is no
10	motivation to.
11	DR. BERG: They may have slipped through
12	a loophole, but what bothers me is it is not clear
13	how diligent a search they may to see whether they
14	are under any regulatory agency.
15	DR. LANDRIGEN: The Consumer Product
16	Safety Commission is it is mostly a paper tiger.
17	And I would be surprised if they had offered any
18	opinion whatsoever in this stuff. There is
19	probably a couple of folks at NIOSH who have
20	tracked it and the person I would get in touch with
21	is Bill Halperin, who was previously the Deputy
22	Director of NIOSH and then went back to Cincinnati
23	to be a working epidemiologist.
24	COL. DINIEGA: Rosie was
25	DR. LANDRIGEN: And Rosie too.

1	COL. DINIEGA: Rosie had said that she
2	was going to look at it from the NIOSH point of
3	view.
4	DR. LANDRIGEN: NIOSH would have more
5	than OSHA. I don't think it has ever come to OSHA.
6	COL. DINIEGA: But who banned it in
7	Europe?
8	DR. LANDRIGEN: I am pretty sure the
9	Brits did through the Health and Safety Executive
10	as a workplace hazard.
11	DR. MUSIC: I agree with Phil about
12	contacting Bill Halperin. But for the record,
13	Halperin has left NIOSH and is the Dean of the
14	School of Public Health at Rutgers, I think.
15	DR. LANDRIGEN: That is right. Yes, you
16	are right.
17	DR. MUSIC: But Rosie agreed yesterday
18	that no matter what this would be a NIOSH issue
19	from the point of view of worker safety. So she
20	would be very happy to work on this.
21	DR. LAFORCE: What I would propose is
22	that Rosie and Phil, if you could sort of wrestle
23	through the request for the question that has been
24	proposed, and we will coordinate it through Ben and
25	myself. And then we will involve individuals after

2 DR. LANDRIGEN: Yes, that is fine. 3 Let me just review the COL. DINIEGA: way we have been doing this stuff. The people who I 4 5 have worked with when they take leads in writing 6 recommendations. Correct me if I am wrong about the 7 But normally somebody drafts up procedure. 8 thing and sends it around through the subcommittee. 9 They draft it after a subcommittee meeting. In this case, this is the subcommittee. 10 Or you and Rosie 11 can draft it. And then once both of you feel that 12 it is where you want it to go, then we will run it 13 through everybody else. 14 Through you. DR. LAFORCE: 15 Yes, through me and I COL. DINIEGA: 16 will send it out. And then they will have time to 17 comment and we will bring it back and we will cc 18 you comments too to see whether or not you want to 19 incorporate or ignore or take under advisement 20 their comments. And then it is ready for final. Yes, that is how we did 21 DR. LANDRIGEN: 22 squalene. 23 COL. DINIEGA: Right. And I think that 24 And what I normally will do is -- the works best. 25 general rule is if we don't hear from you by such

that first cut. Would that be fair enough?

and such a date, that means you concur. And I know some people are out of the country and stuff. There was a period in this last bunch of recommendations where I was in the office only for three days and then I was going to be -- I was gone three weeks, in the office three days, and then I was going to be gone another three weeks, so we had to squeeze everything in. But I think that works best rather than trying to have face to face meetings. When you get beyond one or two people drafting up a recommendation, it really takes a long, long time.

DR. HAYWOOD: In this particular case, it would be useful to have a little preamble. In other words, what the background is and what you are finding.

COL. DINIEGA: Right. And I will edit so that we know when the meeting was and which service asked the question and what the question was. And we are now attaching the question as an attachment to the recommendation. So there is no doubts for the people who read it who asked and why they asked.

DR. GARDNER: It would be nice if this led to some policy in the military that even if the company is not willing to release the ingredients

1	and we can't evaluate exactly what the effects are
2	that there is a ban.
3	COL. DINIEGA: Well, I would
4	DR. GARDNER: That would be a precedent
5	which would help us get supplements out of the
6	exponents.
7	COL. DINIEGA: Well, I would recommend
8	that the Board focuses on medical issues only.
9	Because when you get into logistical stuff, we are
10	not logisticians and that sort of stuff.
11	DR. LANDRIGEN: And we will refrain from
12	commenting on the brand name, which is Nature's Way
13	weapon cleaner.
14	COL. DINIEGA: Yes, I would keep it any.
15	DR. ALEXANDER: That is very 60's.
16	DR. LAFORCE: The late Stanley Kubrick
17	might have had some fun with this.
18	COL. DINIEGA: So as I understand it,
19	Phil, you will be sending me something.
20	DR. GAYDOS: A cool fuzzy jacket, right.
21	DR. LAFORCE: Yes, Joel?
22	DR. GAYDOS: Just one comment while you
23	folks are looking at this. Weapons are a unique
24	area and they are unique because you get
25	tremendously high temperatures in there and there

are a lot of chemical reactions that occur during the firing of the weapons and there are a lot of residues that result. I would ask you when you consider this to look not only at the cleaning effect, like if you are cleaning just a surface inside of the storeroom or something like that, to look at possible use of these inside the bore of some big gun and what might happen to whatever residues are left in there when you get other chemical reactions with the extremes of temperature that occur in that chamber with something left in there.

DR. LAFORCE: I would say that -- Ben brought that up last night when we were having Ben brought the same point. dinner. He said, look, there may be another level of complexity to the question that has to do with the residues that are present, exactly your point, Joel. And would appropriate to perhaps ask it be you or if individuals, that is either Phil or Rosie, questions at a level a little bit below that they can call upon you?

DR. GAYDOS: Well, actually the people at NEHC and the people up at CHPPM would certainly be able to provide the information with regard to

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the current systems that are out there. Certainly CHPPM is supposed to be evaluating all of the military systems from a health standpoint, and they should know exactly what is happening inside the chambers of the weapons that are being used. I don't know if you are aware of this, but there has been a lot of concern in the past about exactly what is being produced. There has been a lot of concern about the carcinogenicity of some of the residues and other harmful effects that might occur to the people who take care of these things and man them.

DR. LAFORCE: One of the things I am always a little afraid of is when people say people at CHPPM as differentiated from Smith at CHPPM or Jones at CHPPM. It would be much easier for us if there is a name of somebody that we could contact. Because once you start making a phone call that way, having been through that in the past -- I mean, if you want to throw away a day, that is easy.

SCHOR: Well, Ι Captain CAPT quess Bohnker at NEHC, but the originator is Captain the Betts. Не is one that led the charge initially. He is the one that has got to deal with

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	CHIS at NEAC.
2	DR. GAYDOS: Isn't he up at CHPPM?
3	COL. DINIEGA: No, he is at NEHC.
4	DR. GAYDOS: Well, I know that he is
5	tied in to both the Navy and the Army communities.
6	So he should be able to direct you in both
7	services.
8	DR. HAYWOOD: Is there a command within
9	the military that is responsible for looking into
10	that sort of thing, independent of whether the
11	product is new or not?
12	DR. GAYDOS: Speaking for the Army to
13	the best of my knowledge, there is still a
14	regulation which was drafted about 1982 which says
15	that all products and devices not speaking
16	medical now, these are things out in the field
17	product improvements or new developments have to at
18	some point in that logistical cycle undergo a
19	review by the medical community looking at health
20	aspects.
21	COL. DINIEGA: And that is what NEHC
22	does for the Navy and that is why they came up with
23	you know, they mentioned a health hazard
24	assessment. That is what they are trying to do.

DR. LANDRIGEN: Off line could I ask you

Т	to give me a name and a phone number?
2	CAPT SCHOR: I would have to search. I
3	don't have that information.
4	COL. DINIEGA: I have it. Again, I will
5	have to send it to you by e-mail.
6	DR. LANDRIGEN: Thanks.
7	DR. MUSIC: Just to assist Bill because
8	he wasn't here during the discussion, but there is
9	another complexity. Not just a residual, but a
10	nuance that presenters discussed. What about the
11	use of this as a degreaser. If they contaminate
12	jet fuel or if it is used for sabotage to create a
13	problem. The illustration he used was a jet taking
14	off and then running out of fuel because something
15	ate up all the fuel.
16	DR. LANDRIGEN: I guess bacteria. It
17	would be great for toxic waste sites.
18	DR. MUSIC: So it is beyond the medical
19	business, but focus on the medical with these as
20	potential areas to discuss.
21	DR. BERG: And the origin of this and
22	why the Navy is particularly concerned is within
23	the close space and closed ventilation system of
24	the ship they were trying to get rid of the old
25	cleaners with the volatile fumes that went around

2 shifting around also. In fact in the Navy, nothing go on board a submarine that is not first 3 evaluated for medical hazards. 4 5 CDR LUDWIG: I am not familiar with the 6 types of things that are being used to clean aboard 7 Coast Guard cutters, but I will ask around. There 8 may be some knowledge about that also because it is 9 used for -- a similar product is used for oil Also, there may be some knowledge in the 10 clean-up. 11 Coast Guard regarding this. If you wouldn't mind 12 sort of including me on an e-mail string so I can -13 - or what I will do is I will refer you to the person in safety. 14 15 COL. DINIEGA: Is that Captain Fajado, 16 the Coast Guard Op Doc? CDR LUDWIG: He is. But I am not sure -17 - I will have to ask around to see who would be the 18 19 one which is dealing with that. I would appreciate 20 it. Thank you. 21 DR. LAFORCE: Thank you. Fair enough in 22 terms of this issue then? DR. LANDRIGEN: Time table? 23 24 COL. DINIEGA: Usually four to six weeks 25 for a draft. And then we take about two to three

But I can see these enzymes getting dried and

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it.

weeks to staff it. But usually at the end of two months, we have a product ready for a signature.

DR. LAFORCE: Okay. That was the only formal question that we had.

COL. DINIEGA: There is the ongoing relationship of the Board with the Ergonomics Work As a refresher, the Work Group I gather is working on its cost benefit model. And their plans are to finalize it in December and stick it on the Web base so that local users can access this model and plug in their own numbers. I think what we had concluded at the end of her talk was, one, when that model is complete, maybe we should review it here. And two, they had sent out a survey to all the services saying tell us about your service ergonomics program. What the are resources dedicated to it, et cetera? And I think something about what policies they have. And they were going to try to gather up that information by the end of October, which I think would be good for the Board to hear the results of what that survey was at the next meeting. A lot of the members and myself were overwhelmed and said they are trying to do it all when they should focus a little bit and there were discussions about focusing on a specific type of

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injury or musculoskeletal disorder or focusing on a particular group like the medics or nurses, one that actually work in that military occupational specialty, or the infantry or something. And use that as a test bid for the model before trying to do the world. And I think that at the last meeting the recommendations were drafted by -- primarily through the Environmental Occupational Health Committee and Dr. Andy Anderson took that, and Dr. Anderson has rotated off.

DR. LAFORCE: But the specific recommendations that were made was the -- and I think it is appropriate to go through these to see if there needs to be a modification.

COL. DINIEGA: Right. And they had a copy of these.

Because I would share a DR. LAFORCE: bit of my concern in terms of the presentation itself that -- and I think, Linda, you also had some difficulty with it. It just seemed frankly too comprehensive and was likely -- I thought that their end date was very ambitious given the scope of the work and the activities that they had in thought mind. The Board I had two concrete suggestions. One, Stan's point in terms of either

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concentrate on one group, whether it is the war fighter or the enlistee or whether it is a more select group, either nurses or corpsman, and to test the model out in a more focused approach. And we had hoped that when they developed -- or in developing their framework to do that, they could share that with the Board before they actually got started. That was certainly my recollection of this.

DR. ALEXANDER: I was really worried because each of the individual data points was quite soft. And so the cumulative total creates a formula that is inherently weak. And, you know, the validity of the product would be very questionable given how weak the infrastructure was. So it would be better to have a model with fewer variables where the variables were of higher quality than to have this amorphous structure that really was going to produce an irrelevant product.

DR. BERG: It seemed as if they were trying to include every possible data point that might conceivably impact on it. And they did not address how much time and effort would be involved in collecting all that information.

DR. ALEXANDER: And each one was

squishy.

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COL. DINIEGA: Well, you know -- go ahead.

I had a comment too, and DR. LANDRIGEN: it. sort of what talking was we were about yesterday. That is that the document here presents pretty much solely а medical problem as collecting data problem. Ιt talks about standard surveillance mode and making those data available. And one of the lessons that has come out of manufacturing industry in the states is ergonomics is much more than a medical problem. Really you can only solve the problem if you look at the whole organization of work -- the pace of work, the postures in which people work, the tasks that they are expected to undertake. The only way that big industry has been able to knock down the rates of these diseases, which are the single most rapidly escalating category of occupational disease in the country today, is to make line managers responsible for the control. And I realize that there comes a point where our grasp could easily exceed our reach here if we are telling the line But I would predict that as long as what to do. this is solely a medical problem or seen solely as

2	COL. DINIEGA: Well, the interesting
3	thing is that the Ergonomics Work Group is
4	chartered under a non-medical agency. It is under
5	the Assistant Secretary of Defense or under the
6	Secretary of Defense or Environmental Security in
7	Installations. So in order for them to bring the
8	question to the Board, they have to route it
9	through health affairs. And the answer was routed
10	back through health affairs and down to them.
11	Members of the work group there are a lot of
12	medical members on the work group, but it is
13	chartered under a non-medical agency.
14	DR. LANDRIGEN: That is still a staff
15	agency, right? Not a line? Environment?
16	COL. DINIEGA: Environmental Security is
17	considered I guess it is a support, but on the
18	line side.
19	DR. GARDNER: It is non-medical.
20	COL. DINIEGA: It is non-medical and it
21	is a support more directly of the line.
22	DR. GARDNER: That is an advantage
23	because you have the safety personnel who are
24	integrated with the line units. That way you can
25	if it comes through safety channels, it comes

a medical problem, we will not control it.

through as part of the line program as opposed to the medical program.

Yes, I got into contact DR. LANDRIGEN: through the thing I was talking about about like consulting vesterday to Chrysler actually to a joint labor management thing, UAW and Chrysler. And there were a couple of factors there that enabled them to get on top of it. One is that the VP at Chrysler, who is responsible for health and safety costs through their insurance program, is also the guy who is in charge of their worker's So the fact that he is double-hatted comp program. avoids the situation that usually applies where the costs that result from these diseases accrue to somebody else. In other words, one person bears the brunt and a different person pays the price. That is a great formula for non-action. And when he realized that he was getting hit with the cost no matter which pocket it came out of, he set about line instituting а system where managers responsible for controlling the disease and their annual evaluation, which in the automotive industry translates to their bonus, is keyed to the rate of disease in their plant. It requires some fairly profound thinking that goes way beyond the standard

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medical thinking.

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DR. LAFORCE: Yes, Ken?

I quess my concern is that CAPT SCHOR: I don't know anybody who is on -- the Environmental Safety folks. I run into them with the Injury Prevention Committee and that is about my knowledge of that. And I don't know much about this area, so I am talking as an outside. But from sort of a policy and execution standpoint, I see the as I listened to the presentation phenomenon, yesterday, of well we can fix it if we do a cost benefit analysis. I am not quite sure if even that as a starting point is the appropriate way to go. It may be the business model applied appropriately or misapplied. It then may be by saying that, well, where do we put this stuff in this model -- oh, medical, you have to give it to me. As a flight surgeon, it is the engineering -- it is turning the medical for the engineering approach the to Well, gee doc, that body is broken, critics. And as those of us as clinicians understand, that is not always a simple answer and it is not always reducible to a cost benefit model or kind of a model. So I am a little concerned that that whole effort may be misdirected. Again, I

don't speak with any great personal knowledge or authority in this area, but that is my concern. I that tying together the people that responsible for this that bear the cost you understanding οf οf t.he know, mу some new directives Presidential that make installation commanders bear the cost of their non-active duty that really are civilian workers, that is a big deal. In the Marine Corps, they are looking at that real closely now. Because it comes out of that base commander's pocket. It means he can't spend money on fixing potholes in the road or something else. So there are some interesting keys that are in this, so that we are not splitting those things up. But I am a little concerned that maybe we are trying to create a model that can't really answer anything. Or if you create a model, you've got to start real small and add variables rather being inclusive from the outset.

COL. DINIEGA: Well, let me quote from the recommendations. "The AFEB supports the strategy to develop and utilize the cost benefit model." And then it goes on to say, "The model will assist DoD and installation level commanders understand where they have prevention weaknesses."

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Then it goes on to say, "Find out the costs and learn the benefits they can expect to accrue from additional focused ergonomic injury prevention."

DR. LAFORCE: David?

I think I am echoing a ATKINS: number of concerns that people have raised. seems that the motivation behind the cost benefit model was to convince people it was worth spending money to address this problem. And we all -- and that led to trying to incorporate all the potential benefits in a very comprehensive but squishy way. And I think we all have concerns about the rigor of that model and just the difficulty of producing it. So I wonder if that is really the right approach or whether a simpler cost benefit approach could at least identify the high priority areas or identify from within some possible strategies where the best payoff would be, without trying to hammer down it is actually going to save the military money or At least narrow in on the narrow set of whatever. priorities. Because I don't know that cost benefit model is going convince line to а commander, oh okay, I am now going to invest a lot of money in changing around our operation.

CAPT SCHOR: Apparently the customer is

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1	the installation commander. That is the focus of
2	effort. That is your aim point with this.
3	COL. DINIEGA: But we are talking about
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5	CAPT SCHOR: So I don't know if they
6	have asked the installation commanders what do they
7	need to know to prioritize their decisions.
8	COL. DINIEGA: We are talking about the
9	primarily civilian work force if it is installation
10	managed. Because they pay the disability costs for
11	civilian workers.
12	CAPT SCHOR: Right.
13	COL. DINIEGA: But they don't do the
14	military the active duty disability.
15	DR. LANDRIGEN: Was the Board presented
16	surveillance data showing trends over time and
17	prevalence rates of carpal tunnel syndrome?
18	DR. LAFORCE: The first one, yes.
19	DR. LANDRIGEN: They were.
20	COL. DINIEGA: This time, she presented
21	there were some rates on all musculoskeletal
22	disorders with no breakdown.
23	CAPT SCHOR: And that was all active
24	duty. All of her data was DMED, which is only
25	active duty. DR. LAFORCE: You see, my

Т	perception is a little bit different than yours,
2	Ben. I thought that this wasn't just civilians.
3	thought that this was aimed particularly at active
4	duty personnel. Do I have that all wrong?
5	DR. ALEXANDER: I thought it was active
6	duty. I hadn't realized that the local installation
7	commander is responsible for the disability
8	benefits for that installation.
9	COL. DINIEGA: For payments, yes.
10	DR. ALEXANDER: That is a huge price
11	tag. I didn't get that message in her presentation.
12	Maybe I slept through that part.
13	COL. DINIEGA: And there is a let's
14	see, occupational medicine. There is, I think, a
15	Presidential Directive to reduce disability costs
16	among federal workers.
17	CAPT SCHOR: And their matching goals
18	this comes in through this injury prevention
19	committee that I also sit on. It is that they are
20	grading bases based on their rates. It is a fairly
21	public grading system. That even makes the
22	installation commanders more uncomfortable.
23	DR. LANDRIGEN: Does that refer to both
24	the uniformed and the civil side of the house?
25	CAPT SCHOR: My understanding is it was

1 only civilian. That was their hard -- there is no 2 other way to track -- I mean through DMED you can, is pretty squishy in that 3 area. 4 compensation costs are what they are tracking. 5 COL. And, DINIEGA: you know, the 6 impression was by most people that the variables in 7 the model -- the required variables on active duty 8 personnel, installation commanders per say, unless 9 they are a TRADOC or something, do not care about -10 say do not care -- don't have any can't 11 involvement in the disability of active 12 personnel. But they have involvement in 13 DR. MUSIC: work days and the unavailability for 14 lost 15 missions. 16 COL. DINIEGA: The units do, not the 17 installation commanders. The unit commanders. 18 GARDNER: When they switched over 19 the workman's compensation to come under the 20 installation commander's budget, that suddenly got 21 their attention and things started changing 22 reduce those workman's compensation costs. And the 23 idea of this whole ergonomics program is to make the same economic argument for the active duty 24

military with a cost benefit analysis. And I really

believe you are not going to get anywhere unless you can make the economic argument because the money drives everything.

DR. LAFORCE: To a base commander.

And a unit -- well, and DR. GARDNER: the TRADOC command. And the TRADOC policy as to how things are going to go through. To all of the senior commanders, if you can demonstrate that if you change your process, you are going to save personnel time and person availability and money, then they are going to implement that policy. you say it is not going to save money, then they care. That is what is going on with adenovirus.

DR. LAFORCE: Let me make sure Т understand this now. Ιt sounds as though the is related to civilians has been problem as it fixed through Presidential Directive by direct fiscal accountability. So, therefore, that has got their interest and they are looking at that already carefully. So that there isn't a whole need for a new process to look at civilian related activities as a result of this Presidential Directive.

DR. GARDNER: Just this year. The President Directive came this year, but the

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beginnings of this transfer was several years ago.

CAPT SCHOR: Then I would suggest now that the responsibility has -- now that the commander has the purse strings, they are frantic to figure out how to eat the elephant -- which part to start on. So I think that may be where the cost benefit model concept came in. How do we stratify -- you know, where do we go after first.

DR. LAFORCE: And that is why active -- yes, Joel. I am sorry.

DR. GAYDOS: Ιf Ι can put this into perspective, and I am sure that if I give you some uniformed attendees information our If you look at the work forces under correct me. the Department of Defense umbrella, the military work force comes under the military commanders. And military commanders are the ones that responsible for managing risks and they are ones who have to deal with claims like disability in terms of time off work and that sort of claim. So, for example, if you have a military exposure -say there is an eye-hazardous let's area, military commander is responsible for making sure that eye protection is procured using their budget. Now the military uses a lot of equipment and a lot

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of this has ergonomic hazard associated with it.
The military is supposed to be taking care of that.
And again, that is supposed to be in their material
acquisition and decision process. So if they are
coming up with a new way of getting an aircraft
mechanic up into the tail section of a plane or
something, they are supposed to be looking at that
and evaluating it. When they design a new armored
vehicle and somebody has to load shells, they are
supposed to be looking at the space required, the
movements required, the weight required and all
those sorts of things. They are supposed to be
looking at vehicles to make sure that they are
vehicles are being developed so that men and women
can operate in those. But that system is supposed
to be built into what they are doing in terms of
purchasing equipment. Colonel Lopez mentioned
yesterday problems with the rucksack. Now that I
found a little surprising because that rucksack
should have been thoroughly tested at a place like
Native Laboratories before it went out into the
field under all sorts of circumstances. So if they
had problems with that, those should have been
detected before that went out. But nevertheless,
that is a military problem. There are issues, there

are disability issues. Those are hard to track. Those are very hard to track. Because it is very difficult short of hospitalizations to track what is happening with the military work force.

Now the military organizations are on an And that installation has a lot of installation. civilians. Generally the is that case the commander installation is given а budget operating that installation, and that includes probably the majority of the civilians and that comes under your OPS or Workman's Compensation programs. So that is what generates your workman's compensation claims. Now that is something that can be tracked. That is something that comes back. Those used to be paid at a very high level and now are being localized down to the commander level. So the commander is faced with dealing with that situation. Now my experience with that at the installation level with regard to ergonomics is how with this ergonomics situation. you deal Because there are a lot of people out there trying to sell them rather expensive evaluation techniques coming in and putting video cameras in places complicated whole lot οf things keyboards, and it is a very difficult situation for

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them to deal with. Some of the situations that I was involved with were very straightforward. For example, one of the depots had a situation where they had an assembly line operation that was just an unbelievable situation where they had people actually twisting, bending and picking up weight and twisting and bending and they had all sorts of I think they did get some extremely costly evaluation done at that point. I think it was a common sense type of situation. And they ended putting а robot in there at that up particular workplace and the workman's compensation claims just went way down.

My experience with this has been when you talk about all the problems that you have with secretarial staff and you have all the keyboards and the other things out there, how do you put this perspective. That is what I think is practical part of it. There are heavy industry types of operations. There are a whole lot of light secretarial types of operations and installation commanders have lawyers at the door every day. They have all sorts of people trying to get a piece of their budget. And they have the workman's compensation claims which I think have some value.

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There are limitations on those. But my perspective is that that is the way that they are -- that is the way they view the problem, which is I think pretty much the way that Ken has tried to state it. So I can visualize this as to the installation commander. I have a lot of trouble seeing how this is going to be applied to a military organization.

DR. LAFORCE: Yes?

COL. DINIEGA: Regardless, I'll get back to Linda's point, which is I think that if the Board is recommending that a cost benefit model be developed, which is what they are recommending, that you need to have one that is going to be can scientifically easily usable and that you justify the input that you are putting in there. If you end up with so many variables and so much uncertainty, that it is just uncertainty on top of uncertainty and you can up with any come benefit that doesn't it you want and mean necessarily translates into anything that can defend. So I listened to that presentation too and thought not only were there too many variables, but probably there were too many variables that nobody had good data on. So I think that to the degree it can be simplified so that it is usable

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while still scientifically defensible, that is what it ought to be.

BERG: Ιt seems to me that the DR. distinction between civilian and military sense is an artificial one. Because regardless of who this is targeted at, the concern of injury prevention is coming up more and more on military side as Ken has said. So ultimately this could be a dual purpose tool. The other thing that struck me is that what they are looking for is not so much to convince us that this makes sense -- you know, prove that we are going to have benefits -but looking for a tool that will say is this fancy chair that only costs \$350.00 really worth it for the secretary who says her back is hurting or is there something else we can do. They are looking for a tool that would let them do some of this analysis.

DR. LANDRIGEN: It is sort of a good news/bad news story. The good news is that as you describe with the episode with the robot, Joel, that smart, common sensical people with some training can make a difference and differences have been demonstrated. They are in the literature that certain fixes work. And the bad news, which you

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1 also noted, is there are some real snake oil 2 salesmen out there making some very large dollars 3 putting out some dubious remedies. 4 DR. ALEXANDER: Nature's Way. 5 Well, I don't know about DR. LANDRIGEN: 6 No comment. But the trick is how does a 7 base commander who is confronted with six different consultants make a rational choice among them. I am 8 9 not sure the cost benefit analysis is going to help there, but I am not sure what will either. 10 11 not 12 -- I am somewhat at a loss to think of the next 13 step. We are going to need to be 14 DR. LAFORCE: 15 specific than some of the rather more general comments that I have heard. And it sounds like the 16 specificity is likely to be to ask Colonel Lopez to 17 18 focus more narrowly along, again, a more defined 19 track and bring that plan back to the Board for a 20 looksee. Is that --21 DR. ALEXANDER: I think, you know, along 22 that line, we didn't have time to go into a lot of 23 discussions with her. But has there been 24 comprehensive review of the literature? DoD can't

be the first guy out here pondering this problem.

Has Chrysler or has Campbell Soup or has Pepsi taken a look at specific occupational specialties where those variables or those algorithms have been worked out where there might be an opportunity to adapt or modify something developed in the work force that would have more scientific validity and reliability than every variable that she presented that needed estimates. I was walking away with the feeling that we were going to end up with this garbage in/garbage out concept because everything was going to be sort of theoretically or creatively determined. And that, while it might produce a product, wouldn't have any true validity.

You know, what does she COL. DINIEGA: need -- or what does anybody need out there. You Take military have a whole bunch of disabilities. or civilian, it doesn't matter. It is hitting you in the pocket either though lost personnel or cost and replacement costs, if you have somebody you are still paying for and you need to cover the temporarily. So what is causing the disability is one question and which category -- if I am going to do intervention program, which category an οf etiology should I focus my efforts on. And once you decide which category, the other thing is the

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best practices or what is in the literature. What intervention works best in that category? And you may apply one that you choose is the best or two or three and evaluate it.

I am not so sure we are -- I know the

whole ergonomics issue in DoD is very confusing because we have so many different types of work. When you say work force, you can look at industrial-based work force, which is more like a Daimler-Chrysler plant in the industrial-based part of the military. You can look at the occasional thing that we do out in the field as part of routinely being a field soldier as work and a work process. And then you can look at the civilian employees that do the secretarial work and whatever else. I am not so sure -- I think the cost benefit thev are proposing is to look intervention and see if it is working. That is what I think the cost benefit model was supposed to do. But it sounds like you need help in identifying the group to focus on.

DR. LANDRIGEN: It all begins with surveillance.

COL. DINIEGA: Yes, that is what it sounds like. How do we prioritize what we are

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going to try to do with this ergonomics realizing that intervention, not all musculoskeletal diseases are ergonomically related? DR. LANDRIGEN: And not all work groups are equal.

COL. DINIEGA: Right.

DR. LANDRIGEN: I mean in any work force there are clear distinctions and there are usually hotspots.

COL. DINIEGA: Right.

DR. LAFORCE: Remember, the recommendations that were made before -- I would go recommendations. and \mathbf{E} The D suggested that recommendations various data collection systems can and should be evaluated. there was concern the last time we went around that we ought not to look at this as this being a done deal. And the point that was brought up in terms of best practices and procedures identification is essential and a priority. Published literature as well as a survey of existing programs will help to identify cost reductions that could be expected from intervention programs.

So I would almost go back to the recommendations that we made before. It is always

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easier to go back to the recommendations before and then tease out something from there and say given what we have heard, can you be more focused and get back to us?

DR. GARDNER: This is -- what you have just been talking about is the concept we trying to put forward in the Armed Forces Unit Production Support Center. That fourth mission is the identification of best practices. The first mission was the surveillance aspect, which critical point. And the fourth was the surveillance of the different programs that are out there or the evaluation and review of the different programs out there or the literature review to develop the best practices. The problem we are having is getting resourcing to do that. That is why the cost benefit modeling has come up. Because you have to convince people that it is economically to your advantage to implement prevention -- surveillance and prevention. Because they just don't believe They are too busy spending money on airplanes to think about these issues. You know, there are lots of examples of failures. What Dr. Gaydos has described is supposed to happen but often doesn't A good example is during the Gulf War,

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they fielded a new aviator chemical protection Well, somebody forgot that aviators wear helmet. glasses and they didn't put lens inserts in those. And it cost a million dollars to suddenly ramp up in a period of a month a contact lens program for military, which has always been forbidden because they didn't do that. I mean these failures happen over and over and over because we don't have the systems in place for collecting the data and monitoring what is going on to see exactly where the problems can pinpoint them in are so we advance.

LAFORCE: Okay. I think that -- I don't disagree with your analysis at all, largely about half the time because when we put preventive maneuver in place, we don't save money. We just create a better situation for an employee and it ends up costing us something to do that. And there are some times when you do save money. The question that has come up is we don't know whether this is costing money or is going to save money. If the -- and this was the whole purpose of this original discussion. If it was going to be -it could be shown that we were going to save money, then this was going to be a powerful lever

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2	direction. If it turns out that it doesn't save
3	money, okay. At least it has been shown.
4	DR. GARDNER: But I would argue that you
5	don't save money in the short run. There is an
6	initial investment. But in the long run, if you
7	start looking at the long term disability costs and
8	the productivity costs and away from work and so on
9	you get all of that stuff in there in fact
L O	you generally will save money. And that is the
L1	point.
L 2	DR. LAFORCE: Okay. Well, who wants to
L 3	take a crack at taking just these four sheets and
L 4	then creating a response to this that summarizes
L 5	these concepts?
L6	DR. HAYWOOD: Who did it the last time?
L7	COL. DINIEGA: Andy.
L8	DR. LAFORCE: Andy did.
L 9	DR. ALEXANDER: I will do that. This is
20	not my field of expertise. I am approaching this as
21	I would approach a dissertation student who
22	okay, I will do it.
23	DR. LANDRIGEN: Would you put
24	surveillance at the heart of it, though, and put
25	cost benefits as sort of a caboose?

to get everybody interested and moving in this

1	DR. ALEXANDER: Yes, sir.
2	DR. BERG: That would be terrific.
3	Because it seems to have gotten around the other
4	way. They are floundering around trying to come up
5	with these grand schemes and haven't done the basis
6	homework.
7	DR. LANDRIGEN: But I would suggest that
8	in doing the surveillance part of it, if we knew
9	case counts and then you could tease out from
10	worker's comp. The first thing is case counts by
11	job category and also I suspect that there is an
12	upward time trend. There certainly is in static
13	industry in the U.S. But another interesting
14	feature would be to see if you could tease out from
15	the worker's comp data base what is the average
16	cost for carpal tunnel and what is the average cost
17	for a back. And without doing cost benefit, which
18	often evolves into witchcraft, just do the cost
19	side of it.
20	CAPT SCHOR: Yes. I mean I think that is
21	what they wanted.
22	DR. LANDRIGEN: And one question is how
23	good is the surveillance going to be for the
24	civilian side.

CAPT SCHOR: People always under-report.

You don't have to worry that it is going to affect it.

CDR LUDWIG: Ι occupational ran an health program in the Army for a couple of years at Fort Drum, New York, and there are enormous amounts of medical surveillance data from the civilian work force that are basically kept in various formats. Now I think things have changed some and I haven't been involved with it for a number of years. Ι think there is a more centralized system and I am not sure how these data have been transferred into the centralized system. But I know that we had a nurse collecting every month all this information on civilians coming in with various things, and it wasn't being used anywhere. So I think there are enormous amounts of data out there, some of it centralized and some of it not. I think once one goes looking for surveillance data, if you want to concentrate on one installation, for instance, you small project could probably start а concentrated project in one area and get a lot of information on one or two different job types.

COLONEL STANEK: If I could just comment. I think that is true, but I also think the key there to what you said is for the civilian work

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1	force. For the military work force, that type of
2	surveillance data is not available at this time.
3	CDR LUDWIG: Right.
4	DR. LAFORCE: You see, and I think that
5	was the main message that I got. You remember the
6	last time around when Colonel Lopez presented the
7	famous rucksack story, I thought it was the Marines
8	at Parris Island that specifically jumped into the
9	pond so that they would short-circuit the thing and
10	be able to get rid of it and get it off of them
11	because their back hurt.
12	CAPT SCHOR: Yes, that was the helmet
13	cam kind of thing. And carrying the extra weight.
14	DR. LAFORCE: Yes, that energy source or
15	the battery or whatever it was.
16	CAPT SCHOR: No, that wasn't Marine.
17	That was Army.
18	DR. LAFORCE: Army? Okay. Whatever it
19	was. All I thought of is it is pretty imaginative
20	that a bunch of people diving into ponds to short-
21	circuit something.
22	CAPT SCHOR: I am pretty sure all those
23	type of kits are cruise missile aim points. We
24	don't use those types of things.
25	COL. DINIEGA: But you know, most

1	disability data is when it ends up in a disability,
2	they know. They know military side who got a
3	disability. They know the civilian side. That is
4	the tip of the iceberg because you don't know all
5	the other ones that never got disabilities. But
6	that is a start.
7	DR. ALEXANDER: There's a cumulative
8	load effect that produces the disability that may
9	not isolate the individual culprit the behavior.
10	CDR LUDWIG: There are also many jobs
11	that overlap.
12	DR. LAFORCE: We have got to close this
13	up.
14	CDR LUDWIG: Whether civilian jobs and
15	military jobs, they are basically doing the same
16	thing.
17	DR. LAFORCE: Let's give it a whack and
18	then we will see what happens. The third area that
19	I think we need to make some recommendations and
20	this is the chlamydia area.
21	DR. ALEXANDER: I'd be happy to work on
22	that one.
23	DR. LAFORCE: Okay. And in thinking
24	about this, what I would like to do is just sort of
25	put something down on the table, which and this

is the disease burden issue. Because whenever w	иe
initiate a discussion for example, Charlotte'	' ន
point as she goes around and says, look, ever	гy
single individual who is an asymptomatic carrier	r,
30 percent of them are going to have an attack of	эf
PID within a year. I am like this and I am saying	Э,
first off, how true is that? I don't know, I am no	эt
that based, one. And two, if it is true, ther	re
ought to be plenty of data in the military on the	ıe
basis of what are the attack rates of PID given th	ne
prevalence rates of chlamydia that are coming in i	if
you look at a base, for example I have forgotte	∍n
the name of the fort in Georgia Fort Jackson,	I
thought it was, wasn't it? And so one of the	ne
things that I thought that might help illuminat	tе
this rather than would be sort of a request the	en
to actually see whether there would be a way o	эf
looking at the issue of disease burden as a way o	эf
accelerating as a way of helping define it.	
DR. HAYWOOD: Some of that has bee	∍n
presented in the past, so there are data within the	ne
military.	
DR. LAFORCE: Not the PID data. I don'	't
remember	
DR. HAYWOOD: The complication rate	∋ຣ

1	represent it.
2	COL. DINIEGA: Specific military rates?
3	I think the rates that have
4	DR. HAYWOOD: That is my recollection.
5	COL. DINIEGA: Yes, I don't recollect
6	military rates.
7	CDR LUDWIG: May I comment on that?
8	COL. DINIEGA: Sure.
9	CDR LUDWIG: From the point of view of
10	the STD prevention committee, which the
11	surveillance and epidemiology subcommittee is my
12	committee. We have made a lot of progress
13	basically determining what it is we need to do.
14	And Dr. Gaydos is on the committee as well and has
15	contributed a great deal of information basically
16	showing us that we have the only prevalence data
17	we have in the military are the collection of the
18	bibliography that he has provided. The only
19	prevalence data that we have in any part of the
20	military population. We could do a DMSS DMED
21	request and find out how much PID there is out
22	there, but it is not going to tell us if it is PID
23	related to a sexually transmitted disease or I
24	mean, there is no specificity.

DR. LAFORCE: The vast majority of PID

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in individuals that are less than 25 are due to 1 2 sexually transmitted diseases. 3 Nevertheless, what CDR LUDWIG: saying is we can't get any association. 4 There is 5 not a lot of association we can get with how far out that is from an infection with chlamydia or --6 7 what I am saying is we can find out how much PID 8 there is, but there is --9 DR. LAFORCE: All I was trying to do -please -- was not a \$5 million study that is a 10 11 prospective study. All I was saying is if you have 12 a 10 percent prevalence rate and you have X number 13 of people that are coming in that are really not screened, if that 10 percent is at a 30 percent 14 15 risk of PID within a year, then it is 10 times .3 16 equals some sort of number. And my question is does 17 that number come anywhere near what it is that you 18 actually see? It is no more complicated than that. DR. ALEXANDER: Well, it is in the sense 19 20 that not all PID is in-patient PID. 21 DR. LAFORCE: Oh, no, no. But it is 22 coded whether it is outpatient or inpatient. If we could do out-23 DR. ALEXANDER: 24 patient and in-patient coding for PID, ectopic 25 pregnancy, that would be a good measure. The other

measure I was thinking of yesterday trying to do something that would be inexpensive -- a guick and dirty assessment of just what are we doing. Because we are getting reports that, oh yes, we are doing it, we are just not counting it. It would be to do a surrogate measure of, okay, well how many rapid tests, non-invasive urine-based tests are you using and let's look at the population and that would give us another measure. Are we anywhere in the ballpark of screening reproductive age women on an annual basis given that volume of usage. Or what is our prescriptive medication count in terms of the drug of choice for managing chlamydia. those would be other surrogate measures that would at least give us a handle on whether or not we are in the ballpark of managing chlamydia now because we don't have the epidemiological data to make that determination.

DR. LAFORCE: My point was that if, for example, you go through the data base that includes both ambulatory as well as hospital PID and it turns out that the rates of disease are much lower than you would have predicted given these epidemiologic criteria or these clinical criteria, then I would start asking myself the question.

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Wait a second. What is the beef? I mean, where are we in terms of this? And it may be a bit more complicated than saying, well, we start off with the universe and we multiply by .3 and we know that bad things are going to happen. That may be true. That may not be true. I think there might be a simple, quick and dirty way of actually looking at Now it may make -- it may be that it is easier to answer or wrestle with the question in terms of even a race specific question. Because we know carrier rates are higher in blacks than whites, and you might be able to sort of sit down and look at these just with the information that you already have from Dr. Gaydos's epidemiologic That is all. Yes, David? studies. DR. ATKINS: I am not entirely clear what exactly that -- whether that data is going to be the determining factor or not. I mean I guess -supporting it seems like we are on record as chlamydia screening at accession, but recognizing there are some logistical problems different services in doing that. DR. LAFORCE: Correct.

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ATKINS:

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recommendation was that, however, because of these
logistical concerns that screening over the next
year is acceptable. It seems like what we don't
have the data that we don't have but should be
able to get at is is that happening. And my feeling
from the discussion yesterday is I don't think the
military is doing any worse than the civilian
sector, but I think that they are probably both
doing equally badly in making sure that that
screening in the context of usual care always
happens. So could we request just data to say from
a limited sample of chart reviews to say that among
100 recruits who were not screened at accession,
what is their likelihood of getting screened over
the next year? How many of them actually go in for
a pelvic exam, and of those that do, how many of
them actually get the test that the clinicians are
saying that they are doing. If we are finding that
it is only 20 percent, then that gives us a little
extra reason to say you need to push harder on
making it happen at accession. If it is happening
within the context of a year, then you have that
separate question, how much are they suffering from
the fact that they didn't get it in those 12
months. I agree with you that I don't think we

really know what the true attack rate on a prevalent case is. But I am not sure that if it is 10 percent or 30 percent

-- maybe that will make a big difference.

DR. LAFORCE: Oh, I think it makes a big difference. Because if it is 30 percent, those are medical costs that are being borne because of the absence of a screening test and treatment. So there are real savings that are involved. That is why the quick and dirty approach in terms of saying if those rates of PID, either ambulatory or hospital-based PID, are as high as we were told, I think this would be pretty persuasive. Because it is costing the Army. It is costing a lot of money if those rates are actually that high.

DR. HAYWOOD: There is a cost to the human being too.

DR. LAFORCE: Yes, of course. And I am not -- but again, we are coming down to this -- the recommendation at accession is there. But one of the difficulties in implementing that is that the Army did not have a PAP smear strategy in place, unlike the Navy. So, therefore, with the Navy testing at accession, it was pretty easy because they were already doing something.

1	DR. ATKINS: But we don't need a PAF
2	smear anymore.
3	DR. ALEXANDER: We don't need a PAF
4	smear. We can use urine.
5	DR. LAFORCE: No, no, no. I am not
6	saying PAP smear. All I am saying is that with the
7	Navy, there was already an accession pelvic that
8	was part of that. Whereas
9	DR. BERG: Opportunity.
10	DR. LAFORCE: That is right. So it is
11	just the opportunity, whereas with the Army that
12	was not the case.
13	DR. ATKINS: But I think we need some
14	feedback from the service folks as to are the
15	obstacles at accession do they think they are
16	sort of temporary and they will eventually get to
17	universal screening at accession? Are they costs
18	in which some cost data might convince the people
19	who are hesitant about investing in the cost of
20	adding something to accession. Or the time issue
21	even peeing in a cup is a logistical issue that is
22	hard for them to get around. I mean, I don't know
23	what data can be helpful.
24	DR. GARDNER: I can tell you it is a

cost issue. We went through this with the sickle

cell trait testing a few years ago. They refused consider doing the sickle cell even trait testing at the MEPS stations, military entrance processing stations, because only two-thirds of the through there eventually people who qo get accessed, and that means it increased their cost by 50 percent. So then they said, well let's try doing it at the bases, which is much more difficult logistically, but it saved money. So if you are going to save money, nobody is going to consider the alternative.

LTC RIDDLE: One thing I want to say is -- I am just trying to think about this. Why -- I am asking myself why do we thrash around with chlamydia in trainees? We don't look to make any other preventive intervention except immunizations in trainees. We don't look to screen trainees for anything else. We have a system to check out the fitness of recruits. We bring them in and we train them and then we go forward and we have a medical system to take care of their ongoing needs. I am just trying to ask myself why is this different. There may be good reason. I mean there may be an epidemic out there οf expensive and epidemic proportions that would require drastic or targeted

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action for one disease entity. But I would like to kind of know the -- then maybe you know how did I see where General Kiley asked the this come up? question, but I don't really think that is answer. I mean how did this issue surface? why not screen them all for sickle cell anemia? The answer to that is, well, we do that at the MEPS station. We do that at the MEPS physical. -- then what I am getting to is why don't we do Joel, maybe you can -- I am really this in MEPS? not trying to -- I really just want to know why this? Why is this special? Why can't we deal with it in the regular process, which is to have a MEPS physical and deal with this and then say to the person, well, you have got to go back and treated by your doctor and you are not set to come in until you do this.

at least it was voiced that that would be one of the alternatives, to have it done sometime before accession -- during the MEPS process. And then the question was could that be worked out. I mean, I think if the Army wanted to pursue that, you would have to work it out with MEDCOM. But I think John is correct in saying that it would be a lot of

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money for them and who is going to come up with the money. I mean, that is a way to do it.

DR. ATKINS: A lot of money if it is done through MEPS?

COL. DINIEGA: Because they only access a small few.

No, MEPS doesn't do that. LTC RIDDLE: job is to determine fitness not to render medical care. In the case where we might take the approach of well you are unfit -- you are welcome come back with a join, but you've got to negative urinalysis. You have got to go to your doctor and pay this for yourself and then come Now there are deficits for doing it that way back. But, again, I keep getting back to my as well. point. Why do we treat this case different? Ιt may be different. But we do have a mechanism to check out the fitness of soldiers as they come in and to screen out the unfit and let in the fit.

DR. LAFORCE: I think it is the disease burden and also the fact that this is an infectious agent and people have intercourse. There are two issues. One, there is a clinical issue to that individual who is asymptomatically infected. In other words, what is the disease burden. And also,

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1 sex occurs and this is an infectious agent that 2 of passed around. So there are a couple 3 things. The same could be said of 4 LTC RIDDLE: 5 syphilis. 6 DR. LAFORCE: Oh sure. But this is a 7 lot more common. 8 LTC RIDDLE: just I amtrying 9 contemplate this disease. I kind of know the answers. But again, why don't we test every basic 10 11 trainee for syphilis. 12 DR. ALEXANDER: Or herpes. 13 LTC RIDDLE: I mean, we could go on and on and on. I mean, why chlamydia? 14 15 DR. ALEXANDER: I'd like to come back to 16 I would like to answer your question about 17 chlamydia. I think it is a no-brainer. 18 benefit analyses have been done, in fact 19 specific military cost benefit analyses have been 20 done. Chlamydia is infection that an is 21 ubiquitous. It is easily treated. It is 22 diagnosed. The adverse outcome are so undesirable, 23 particularly in terms of women's health. That with 24 an early intervention, we can do something that is

really producing a soldier, male or female, that is

not infectious. That is important in a military public health person, environment. As а Ι just even trying to defend this trouble because it is so intuitive, it is so logical. This is a case where we can make a profound difference. We have been successful at the national level getting this implemented in prisons and underserved populations of women in managed care, and it seems odd that we are having to fight for it to available in the military. That is the part that seems like such a major disconnect to me. If we have to do it, let's do it. And if there aren't military resources to do it, then let's be creative and utilize some of those outside resources so that the people in the military don't have a chlamydia burden. It is a very easy thing to justify from a public health perspective.

DR. LANDRIGEN: A thread that seems to be running through this that we haven't addressed explicitly is the question of what is the frequency -- what is the optimal frequency of testing. I mean, one option is to do it a single time at the time they do their intake physical. But as Marc says -- he doesn't have any data to prove it -- but people probably do have sex. And therefore, there

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1	are subsequent opportunities for passage. So the
2	question arises, should it be done monthly, three-
3	monthly, six-monthly, annually, just once?
4	DR. ALEXANDER: Well, the CDC has made
5	recommendations to that effect. Annual screening
6	of reproductive-age women 15 to 25 is recommended.
7	That is whether you are in a publicly funded
8	clinic, a prison, a Planned Parenthood clinic or
9	DR. LANDRIGEN: Just women?
10	DR. ALEXANDER: Well, right now.
11	Actually both were in the guidelines. The most
12	recent one has made funding available for women.
13	This year, as we go back to Congress for funding,
14	we are asking for funding for male screening as
15	well. You know, we are trying to put the
16	infrastructure in place to make the funding
17	available to cover this. We could essentially
18	eliminate chlamydia if we had an aggressive
19	national program. And we could prevent you know,
20	half the infertility in the U.S. is attributable to
21	chlamydia. And those bills are enormous.
22	DR. LANDRIGEN: So you would be
23	advocating that it be incorporated in the intake
24	physical and then repeated annually thereafter?
25	DR. ALEXANDER: I am advocating that we

make the population in DoD -- let them have access to the same treatment standards that women in civilian settings have. Now how that is done -- I am not going to argue whether it should be done at MEPS or whether it should be done at basic training or AIT. But there should be annual access of women in the military to chlamydia testing.

DR. ATKINS: And we don't know that that is not happening.

DR. ALEXANDER: Right.

DR. ATKINS: So I think the first step is to request the data to address that. And then -

There are a couple of points DR. BERG: that I would like to make. I mean, we had two presentations on military medical history. STDs have always been a burden in the military. there has been a lot of moral overtone to it too, but they have always been a burden. And now when we are looking at career forces, it is not just the treatment cost, it is the cost of active duty people who can't get pregnant and want to find out why and what they can do about it. STDs have historically been one of the major disease burdens of the military. And now we have the tools and the

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techniques to involve the males too. There was always -- screening for males has always been a good idea, but it is really hard to get some guy who is going to let you stick a swab up his crank if he is not symptomatic. Now with urine-based testing that is very good, we can get around that and we can attack both ends of the problem so we don't ping-pong it back and forth.

To shift gears a little bit, at this stage of the game I am a little confused as to what the issue is here. Are we trying to restate our recommendation for chlamydia testing? Are we trying to say this has fallen on deaf ears and what do we need to do to strengthen the recommendation? Do we need to get data? Or are we really trying to figure out where the best time to do this is? it the MEPS? Is it recruit training? after that? Or is it all three of those questions? Sort of all three. LTC NEVILLE: But

speaking for the Air Force -- I am not representing anybody but mу own office, I suppose. But everybody, clinicians well, as accept those recommendations to screen annually, 15 to 24 And I have to say again that I think whatever. that probably happens in the Air Force. I can't say

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1	that. But that would be relatively easily
2	obtainable data that we could bring back to the
3	next Board meeting if you want to know that.
4	Because the lab that does most of those things for
5	the Air Force is co-located with me and that would
6	be relatively easy to do. Chart reviews may be a
7	little bit more of a problem. Pardon me?
8	CAPT SCHOR: Do it for the Army too?
9	LTC NEVILLE: Well, we might actually be
10	able to do that. But it would be easy to do the
11	PID or the disease burden issue or relatively easy
12	with DMED ambulatory or in-patient or whatever.
13	That is quick and dirty.
14	DR. GAYDOS: That is the problem. It is
15	dirty. That is the point that we need to make.
16	LTC NEVILLE: Right.
17	COL. DINIEGA: But if the answer is
18	well, are you saying no answer will be acceptable?
19	DR. GAYDOS: Can I just maybe go back
20	and try to answer some of the questions that have
21	come up? First of all, I would like to point out
22	that there is a chlamydia epidemic in the United
23	States. It is extensive. There have been extensive
24	studies done with regard to civilian populations
25	which were comparable to the ones we see in the

military. And there has been at least one study
that has shown that one hit in terms of screening
and treating will reduce your PID significantly
over the course of a year. When this got started
about 1994 or so, we looked at the in-patient rates
for PID and ectopic pregnancies for the Army. They
were I can't remember the number, but they were
just incredibly higher than what was reported for
the civilian world. I mean, they were extremely
high. And my understanding of what occurred at that
time was that the Navy took the data and
information that was available on chlamydia and
took the position that when we released a trainee
to the Navy from basic training, we want that
trainee to be as physically and as mentally fit as
they can be because they are going to be sent
places in the world where the level of medical care
is not uniform. The opportunity to go in for
periodic exams and a whole lot of things are
different. So we want that individual to leave
Great Lakes in the best mental and physical
condition that we can. I am trying to tell you
what Commander Ryan said as far as what was going
on at that time. So they decided based on what was
available at that time to screen men and women and

to treat men and women. No we can disagree with the sensitivity of the test they used, but nevertheless that was their approach and that is what they did. Somewhere along the line this came into the Marine Corps too. I don't know when the Marines got involved with this.

Now with regard to the Army, these very high rates were part of the package that went forward and resulted in the funding for this study. Now what has happened is that -- and Dr. Stanek I hope will be able to comment on this -- I think going from the early 1990's, when we had a much more liberal policy for admissions to now, we don't really know what is happening out there with regard to treatment of PID or even ectopic pregnancy. I don't have a lot of confidence in the outpatient data as it is coming in right now. So my feeling is, and we have looked at this, is that we really would have a pretty difficult time at this point in time going in and taking what is available in terms of inpatient and outpatient and characterizing what the experience is with regard to PID and ectopic pregnancy out there in the services. The situation is that there is a lot of anecdotal information out there from people who are working

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with women in the field that women in uniform are
being placed in a lot of positions where the
standard of medical care as we know it here in the
States or that we expect to be practiced here in
the States is not available to them. If you are
out in the desert somewhere or you are someplace
else, it is not that easy. A lot of people come
back and I am not just talking about the Army
I am talking about the other services also and
said in talking to these women, number one it is
not convenient a lot of times to go out there and
do this. Number two, if you are going to if you
are out there with a medical unit, then you become
very well acquainted with all the people in that
unit and sometimes these women are not going to
come in to medical care for something like a GYN
problem because they know the people in the unit
and they are reluctant to do that. I have
received this from a lot of people, and it is also
not convenient. And in a lot of places in the
world, the story that we get back is that if a
woman comes in and she has any significant genital
type complaint, she is probably going to get
evacuated because an examination won't be able to
be done. So there is this concern about the

standard of care that is actually going on out there.

What has happened now is I will tell you that based on these types of things, the Department of Defense has given considerable money -- for example, the University of Pittsburgh has received The University of Pittsburgh has a lot of money. actually been working on self-treatment kits. These are self-treatment kits for women and the proposed use is that for certain types of symptoms, in the absence of a fever, in some of these areas they would be able to these kits. The use Department of Defense has also funded studies to look at diagnostic alternatives such as the SAS or self-administered swab, where a women who may not be able to go into the clinic and be able to be put up into stirrups and have the type of examination that we are accustomed to seeing, but would use the self-administered swab which could then be sent off to the laboratory and tested. So there is a -there are different standards of care throughout the world for people in uniform, and particularly women in uniform. And I don't have confidence at this point in time in the outpatient data to look at what is happening. I think without the

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outpatient data, we are at a great loss the way that we are developing a managed care system in the military to say that we can really characterize what is going on with regard to PID and ectopic pregnancy.

DR. BERG: How do you feel about the outpatient data from major medical centers like the big Army posts. I can see certainly on a deployment that these factors would be operable. Are they likely to be operable at a major military post or even though they are outpatient, many of these objections would not been there.

DR. GAYDOS: Colonel Stanek is from the Defense Medical Surveillance Center.

COLONEL STANEK: I guess my concern with that is when we saw the ADS bubble sheet that are used for the surveillance and how they collect the data. Part of the issue there is how it is coded. I think getting back to what was said earlier, we don't have a clear indication of this screening, if it is going on and if it is taking place during the year after they finish their recruit training. If someone gets coded as chlamydia, the question is do they come in for chlamydia and be treated, if that was what the diagnosis was, or did they come in

because they were in contact with chlamydia and got
treated. Or did they come in and was that just
part of the screening. When you are at our level
when we are just getting that data, sometimes it is
hard to answer that question. I think it is a
question to really answer this question
correctly, we need to answer the question ask
the question of what is going on at the MTFs in the
year after they finish their accession and after
they finish their training. And then we can more
better quantify if this is really a problem. I
agree with Dr. Gaydos. I have some concerns with
the ambulatory data. It is better than it was
three, four or five years ago, but it is not where
I would like for it to be. Hospitalizations are
going down, but that is true across the entire
nation within managed care. We are treating more
as an outpatient. So some of the things that we
would like to know to answer this question may be
hidden and we may need to ask some second level
questions to get a better answer.

DR. ALEXANDER: And it is problematic with chlamydia given that 75 percent of women are asymptomatic.

COLONEL STANEK: Exactly.

DR. ATKINS: But not if we are defining the issue as PID.

DR. ALEXANDER: Right. Right. Which disease burden.

Just real quickly, I would CAPT SCHOR: just suggest from а Navy and Marine standpoint that the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has a women's health code that is staffed by a nurse practitioner and very capable staff and has board meetings. And they look at a lot of different things. It is code O2W, women's health. They look at deployment health. They look at the issues of presentation. They have commissioned surveys. They have a budget. They have the power to get people to do things and look at things. And I am sure they have looked at a lot of this -- practice guidelines and implementation and a lot of these issues. at least in our side of the fence, they probably have a lot of these answers so that we don't have to go and reinvent the wheel. I don't know that absolutely for sure, but they are heavily engaged in this whole area and have gotten great support from the Surgeon General and from the folks out in the field.

DR. LAFORCE: Questions?

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1	LTC NEVILLE: Just two things. One is
2	from an Air Force point of view, I don't have any
3	problem at all accepting the AFEB recommendation
4	for screening at accessioning. The only problem is
5	that I don't control that and it is hard to
6	implement in the vacuum of the medics. We can't
7	just do that. So I would like to and want to and
8	am going to try to do that.
9	The other thing is at least in the Air
10	Force anyway in the last year, there has been a lot
11	more emphasis from the MTF commander level or
12	provider level for cleaning up the data of the
13	ambulatory coding. That is a complete separate
14	issue, so I have a little bit better confidence in
15	the Air Force ambulatory codes now than I did a
16	year ago. I am not sure about the other services.
17	DR. GARDNER: A point of order. Where
18	in the accession process does the screening for
19	syphilis and tuberculosis occur? It seems like it
20	is analogous.
21	DR. ALEXANDER: MEPS.
22	LTC NEVILLE: Those get done in the Air
23	Force the weekend they step off the bus.
24	DR. ALEXANDER: They screen for
25	syphilis?

1	CDR LUDWIG: MEPS screens for TB.
2	LTC NEVILLE: Well, by history TB.
3	DR. GARDNER: The skin test and the
4	syphilis serology I assume the skin test and the
5	syphilis serology are done I am sorry at the
6	initial step or later on after they are in?
7	LTC NEVILLE: For the Air Force, when
8	they arrive at training at Lackland Air Force Base
9	that first weekend.
10	DR. GARDNER: Okay. So it is not when
11	they are at the recruitment center?
12	LTC NEVILLE: They may get it at the
13	MEPS station. I am not sure.
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	DR. GARDNER: We need somebody from
14	DR. GARDNER: We need somebody from AMSARA to tell us more about what MEPS is currently
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	DR. GARDNER: We need somebody from AMSARA to tell us more about what MEPS is currently doing. But when I was looking into it a few years ago, they don't do chest x-rays and they don't do CBC's. The only reason they draw blood is for HIV. I mean the big HIV issue was the first time they started drawing blood. I don't think they even do a urinalysis. DR. GAYDOS: I don't think they are doing syphilis serology.

that AMSARA looked at and the cost benefits were so low that I think that was dropped because it was thought that whatever positives would come through, they would be picked up on their other physical exams.

DR. GARDNER: They screen for everything by history and a brief physical.

DR. ALEXANDER: In an effort to sort of focus on what it is we might do, I thought maybe we might as the Board ask two questions for the services to report back next time. One might be could we clarify the disease burden? Do we have any kind of profile on what the adverse outcome associated with chlamydia is, as best as can be determined in a quick and dirty assessment looking at in-patient and out-patient data bases with PID and ectopic pregnancy. Just what do we know? That might be one question.

The second question would be what is the current screening picture for chlamydia in the services? What are the policies that are in place and then what sort of surrogate measures could be presented that would paint a picture of what is currently happening, whether it is a survey of practitioners that could be done in a quick and

dirty way or whether we count the number of diagnostic units that were dispensed or the number of treatment courses that were dispensed. But just paint a picture as best we can of what is going on If we were tasked to present, okay, what is happening in the Coast Guard with chlamydia screening, how could you go about doing that? limiting your parameters. Use your creativity and come back and report. And maybe based on that feedback at the next meeting, we could be a little more focused in our recommendations.

DR. LAFORCE: David?

DR. ATKINS: And I would just add as a third thing some discussion of the specific barriers within each service to doing screening at the -- not at MEPS, but I guess at the basic training or whatever and what the barriers that they are facing are.

DR. LAFORCE: Bill?

DR. BERG: I would add on that the apropos of the discussion here that the report should include some sort of discussion of their level of confidence in the figures. Because I have heard doubts raised about it, but I haven't heard any of the doubts raised to the level of saying

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forget about it, it is not worth the effort. Or do any of you want to jump in and -- I hear a lot of qualifiers and hesitancy, but I don't --

LTC NEVILLE: It is hard to judge the accuracy of the data because it is all -- unless you did -- it is five minutes to do the search on the data base. The DMED does that and you are done minutes. in five But the accuracy οf ambulatory data, you would have to do some -- do that search and then go into the records and see if it actually reflects the visits -- the medical note matches the code that was given for that visit, and that is a much harder thing to do.

DR. BERG: That sounds like a wonderful idea.

DR. LAFORCE: Except that again, looking at the question, one of the advantages of looking at data within the military is that no matter how sort of flawed it may be, it is not 100 percent flawed. It just isn't. So there is going to be, you know, the bell shaped curve that is going to go around. But making the presumption that it is not useful -- that is a little tough for me. You know, I would make the presumption that gee we ought to make the presumption that it might be useful.

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us feel that bad or questionable data is worse than
no data. I think that the problem is you heard
yesterday from Dr. Pavlin about people who just
stopped reporting. I think there are a number of
people in this room and there was somebody who
mentioned something yesterday about people just
checking off a box to get the requirement over with
and reporting something. There is a lot of that
going on. And I think we appreciate that. We don't
know how much and we don't know where. And I am
going to remain very skeptical and hesitant to
place any confidence in those data until there is
some audit to say exactly what is happening in
terms of what percentage is being reported or not
reported and what is being reported correctly or
inappropriately. I think that is what has been
done. And you folks have done some of that, right
Scott? You conducted an audit of some of your
reporting.
COLONEL STANEK: That was with the
reportable events
DR. GAYDOS: These were reportable
events. And do you recall what percent of
reportable events were being reported?

DR. GAYDOS: If I may comment. Some of

1 COLONEL STANEK: We compared it to 2 ambulatory data. So we are up to now I think 60 percent of compliance. 3 4 COL. DINIEGA: Which was gold 5 standard. 6 COLONEL STANEK: This is the question. 7 I wasn't trying to say we DR. BERG: 8 should not do it. But I think it is appropriate to 9 get some idea of the evidence. Because the danger is we descend into epidemiological nihilism. 10 11 don't have perfect data, so we are not going to 12 look at it. We don't make any progress. 13 DR. LAFORCE: Okay. We've got a couple 14 Yes? more. ENGLER: 15 Just from the clinical DR. 16 perspective, the ADS systems in terms of the bubble 17 sheets inserted into our system which adds four to 18 ten minutes check-in time, you can't in a clinic 19 actually reflect all the diagnoses that you see. 20 We have no help like in a group practice where 21 somebody is helping us develop strategies 22 clinic, you really need coding. In а 23 different sheets because you are limited with 24 What the sheets do is they make a diagnoses.

decision about a blank and generic one that happens

to fit. I can tell you stories like the Chief of
Neurology in his frustration just said, I don't
care. Code it all prostatitis and the hell with
it, pardon my French. I think the problem and
people are, I think, this year making some efforts
to do strategies for a compromised improvement so
you are at least in the ballpark as a system. But
I think you heard yesterday, code it all as fever
or do whatever. Just whatever day you look at,
you've got to understand it could be from 25 to 50
percent wrong and garbage in is garbage out or
more. And there is no administrative
infrastructure support like in any private practice
within our system for doing this work. And there
are very few people in many of the smaller clinics
who even have somebody who is willing to sit down
with the coding book and try to structure it. It
is not like there is a massive army of preventive
people reaching out to bidirectionally work with,
hey guys, you could help us if you do this or that.
There is a lot of smoke and mirrors even though
the service representatives get up and say, oh yes,
we have this system and we are collecting data. It
is just like with the immunization tracking from
any of the services. I can tell you from a clinic

perspective, it is 25 to 40 percent of the time
absolutely wrong. There is duplicate stuff and
people are marching happily along and saying,
aren't we wonderful, we are doing this tracking.
That doesn't mean that some data isn't at least
useful, but please put in big letters plus or minus
and the range may be bigger than 50 percent. And it
could lead you to wrong conclusions. And again, the
illustration of PBD's, where they were talking
about, oh, we need to treat people with BCG and I
brought up the point that we have documented that
people are giving PBD's, typing in negative and
telling a person if you see something come back.
So I said your baseline PBD levels are totally
unreliable. So you cannot make any assessment of
the need for BCG until we really try to train
people to at least have the basic knowledge of
doing the test correctly. Again, just understand
the clinical perspective. It is not because
clinicians don't care or that they don't want to be
part of the process of improvement in identifying
issues. But this Board needs to also recommend
that there has to be some reality look at what it
takes to do the work to do the correct data
capture Frenchody is pretending that that happens

out of the ether and there is a no cost solution, and that is not what is going to be happening in reality.

I think you have in the DR. GARDNER: military very dedicated health professionals who take good care of their patients. But there is no -- very little system support to provide for the data collection process. And frankly, they only do what they absolutely have to do in that respect. They are very meticulous at coming up with the right diagnosis and doing the right treatment and making sure the person is taken care of. But what goes on the reporting record is extra work that they want nothing to do with and they are going to simplify it as much as possible. Right now, they are being forced -- they are counting visits in terms of staffing and manning, so they are being forced to turn in something. And in order to account for actually how many patients they see, but there is nothing that coerces them to put the correct diagnosis on the sheet.

DR. LAFORCE: Does the military have any sentinel sites? This problem is not unique only to the U.S. military. Many other facilities have usually sprinkled within systems what are called

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sentinel sites where they have invested more in terms of resources so that you have got at least some comparison.

CAPT SCHOR: No.

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DR. LAFORCE: No? Okay, thank you.

LTC NEVILLE: I will say, though, in the Air Force within the past year -- and this is maybe way off the topic of chlamydia screening -- but there is a whole big emphasis and investment in primary care optimization. And every single MTF sends 8 to 10 people to a training thing for a week-long, and this is one of the biggest of garbage in/garbage out and they have manage their populations and on and on and on. So more confident with Air feel а lot Force ambulatory coding today than I did one year ago. I said that already. And if it please the Board, we can look at the Air Force data. I don't have the resources to say we will go to the MTF and do chart reviews and verify that stuff, but I can try to get some kind of a sense from a sister organization, Brooks Air Force Base, that is doing that, going to the MTF's. Just some sense of how accurate that stuff is. We can get this stuff from the ambulatory DMED for the Air Force anyway and just present that

2	DR. LAFORCE: Okay. We've got to close
3	this.
4	DR. BERG: I was just going to say I
5	think we need to send a question to the services
6	asking for the three that Linda said. Asking for
7	the information so we can move forward on this, not
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9	DR. LAFORCE: Linda, can you draft
10	those? The three questions that we talked about?
11	In other words, what is happening in terms of
12	screening? How often in other words, that was
13	your report card is what you are asking for, right
14	David?
15	DR. ATKINS: Right. Some sample.
16	DR. LAFORCE: Yes, what is happening.
17	That is point one. Point two, are there any data
18	using whatever reporting data. Perhaps it is
19	better for the Air Force than the Army. I have no
20	way of knowing. But at least some sort of idea as
21	to clinical burden. And I have succeeded so well, I
22	have forgotten the third point.
23	COL. DINIEGA: One was the disease
24	burden. One was compliance to female recruits
25	getting a chlamydia screening and a PAP smear

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for what it is worth.

1	within the first year of enlistment. And third was
2	the specific barriers to recruit screening
3	implementation.
4	DR. LAFORCE: Barriers.
5	DR. ALEXANDER: We added a fourth, which
6	was just a comment on the confidence in the quality
7	of the data.
8	DR. LAFORCE: Okay.
9	COL. DINIEGA: Right.
10	DR. HAYWOOD: And problems with
11	screening.
12	DR. ALEXANDER: And problems. That is
13	correct. Thank you.
14	DR. LAFORCE: It is nice to be clear.
15	DR. ALEXANDER: I need a list.
16	DR. LAFORCE: Okay. The next item that
17	I have on the list is I hate to say this, but it is
18	adenovirus. Oh, thank you for this raucous
19	laughter. I am just going to ask the Board whether
20	it is worthwhile Ben, what do we have, 11
21	statements that were made?
22	COL. DINIEGA: No, we have a statement
23	in 1995 and a statement in 1998. 1995 was when
24	they were beginning to get threats of shutting
25	down. 1998 was when obviously the company was

going to shut down and we had limited stocks
remaining and how we should best use it. And then
again endorsing the continued availability of the
vaccine. None since 1998. However, what I would
like to say at this point is besides the Institute
of Medicine committee that is looking at endemic
disease vaccines in the military, which Dr. Pahland
and Dr. LaForce are members of, and they are having
a meeting Thursday and Friday of next week and many
of the preventive medicine officers are liaisons to
the Board also, there was a new directive from the
Secretary of Defense to health affairs and the
Defense Research and Engineering Director that
tasked them to put together an expert panel to
review the whole military vaccine research
development and acquisition. And I think we ought
to focus on the acquisition once things are
developed and the availability of making those
vaccines. That they have asked for the AFEB
the Executive Secretary to be there as a liaison in
case there are questions because we have addressed
so many of those issues before. The same with the
IOM committee. That is the reason I go to that.
So it is up to the Board.

What I think the issue is, just to sort

of summarize, is there is no vaccine. We are having
outbreaks. The impact is more medical than
operational at this point because the recycling
criteria has really changed and many of the
patients are still graduating with their cohorts
that they entered with. So it is how to gain
momentum and at the same time there is this \$14
million that has been turned over to the
acquisition side of the house at Medical Research
and Development and Acquisitions Command and they
are ready to let a proposal on the street. And the
gist is that \$14 million isn't going to be enough,
but they are ready to get a proposal. It is viewed
by Medical Research and Development Command as an
acquisition issue at this point and not a
development issue of a new vaccine.
DR. LAFORCE: What I was going to
propose is that we do the same thing here that we
did in terms of our concerns with the criticisms

for the Anthrax vaccine policy. And it would really be a letter to the Secretary from the Board.

COL. DINIEGA: I think we should.

DR. LAFORCE: And the letter from the Secretary of the Board -- I personally am very worried about the magnitude of the outbreaks when a

quarter of the cases have demonstrable changes on chest x-ray. Somebody is going to die and again it is so statistically possible for this to happen.

Just literally, the more you add to it, the more one is going to fall off at the tip end of that bell-shaped curve. And that is the nature of the -- and the letter that I propose I would like to draft has got to have that in it.

DR. ALEXANDER: Yes, exactly.

DR. LAFORCE: In terms of if they are not listening to either the epidemiology or the stuff, somebody has to at least again underscore the point that they are taking a significant risk of being really called to task in terms of visibility or death.

DR. ALEXANDER: That is a wonderful thing to do.

DR. ENGLER: That is crucial. If you put that in, then those of us who have been trying to help lobby or advocate or whatever have something from an expert panel that is independent. But you have to really lay out the implications of an operational sudden effect. If you can say that and extrapolate a bit, that would allow people to go to each of their services and beyond and say, look,

1	you can look really bad if you don't listen to
2	this.
3	DR. ALEXANDER: That is exactly right.
4	And by putting that in writing, what happens is
5	that if in the unfortunate situation there is a
6	death, that letter that file copy of that letter
7	is just phenomenal fodder for a Congressional
8	hearing. And at that point, the situation is
9	resolved.
10	DR. LAFORCE: Well, wait a second, I am
11	not too crazy about a Congressional hearing.
12	DR. ALEXANDER: No, that is absolutely
13	true.
14	DR. LAFORCE: All I want is for this
15	disease to go away.
16	DR. OSTROFF: I told you so's don't do
17	much for
18	DR. LAFORCE: No, not for the kid that
19	is dead.
20	DR. ALEXANDER: Not for the kid that is
21	dead but sort of putting people on notice.
22	DR. ALEXANDER: That is absolutely
23	right.
24	DR. LAFORCE: The point is to make them
25	aware of that potential and that if they do have to

1	ramp up their training, it will have a much more
2	substantial impact than it is currently having. I
3	think those are the two points that need to be
4	made. You might not be seeing it right now in terms
5	of impact and in terms of recycling, but the
6	potential is certainly there.
7	DR. LAFORCE: Okay, we have got a lot of
8	suggestions to start.
9	DR. GARDNER: What has happened since
10	1998 is you've ran out of vaccines and you've got
11	epidemics. And you've never addressed that and I
12	think you need to address that.
13	DR. LAFORCE: Julian?
14	DR. HAYWOOD: Last night, we discussed
15	briefly some alternatives for how to acquire
16	vaccine. Do you think it is reasonable to put any
17	of that in the letter, Dr. Music?
18	DR. MUSIC: I think that would be
19	appropriate if you are comfortable talking about
20	different ways of acquiring vaccines.
21	DR. LAFORCE: The IOM I mean, that is
22	one of the things as I said, with the IOM, the
23	adenovirus story, I am so committed to this. That
24	is a case study and it is going to be the case
25	study which is going to say this is we are so

screwed up that we can't figure out how to partner a private sector partnership with a public sector partnership to get this done. I just -- it is sort of -- and we are talking about enzymes for crying out loud. You know, we are cleaning all the -- and I am saying, where the hell are we? DR. ALEXANDER: Right. Okay. I will draft this DR. LAFORCE: and I will try to get this around within a week or This -- I am going to -- I would really suggest if you could please give it some time -and particularly you. You -- Steve does a lot of this stuff as do you, Linda. If you could look at this. I don't want an epistle to the Indians. 14 DR. ALEXANDER: Right. DR. LAFORCE: 16 But I do want something that is pretty focused and that is hopefully a onepager but no more than a one-and-a-half pager, in order to quarantee or hopefully quarantee at least it gets read. Yes? LTC NEVILLE: One last comment. The

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line 06 commander at Lackland told me that -- in a

hallway conversation -- that somebody is going to

And somebody is going to die from a preventable

die, is that right, doc?

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The statistics show that.

1	disease. That was the main thing somebody is
2	going to die was important, but that it was
3	preventable was the main thing that boiled his
4	blood.
5	DR. ALEXANDER: He got it.
6	LTC NEVILLE: He got the picture. But he
7	is an 06. He was as committed as I am to try to
8	push this letter up through the line chain. But he
9	is gone now. The fact that it is preventable is
10	important.
11	COL. DINIEGA: Do we know the case
12	fatality rate prior to the vaccine, Joel? Is that
13	all?
14	DR. GAYDOS: No. There were very few
15	deaths. In fact, all the deaths that we know that
16	have been associated with adenovirus have been
17	reported in the literature and they are in that
18	package.
19	DR. LAFORCE: There are three, aren't
20	there, that I know of?
21	DR. GAYDOS: I think there were five.
22	DR. LAFORCE: Okay. But it is something
23	like that.
24	CDR LUDWIG: The other big point,
25	though, is the base closure. A training base may

have to close because of this disease. That is a huge impact also. Not like somebody dying, but it is going to get somebody's attention if there may be a base closure because so many people are ill.

DR. LAFORCE: The other thing that I spoke to Ben about is what I would like to do is draft this note. And what we have as a strategy over the next month or couple of months is to try to get an appointment with the Surgeon's General, one after another. And what I would like to do is have a folder for each visit and that folder would have the adenovirus letter. You probably only have one thing to talk about, and I really don't want to get wound up with chlamydia. But what I do want to talk to the Surgeon's General in terms of not only just sort of shmoozing and saying, hello, this is what it is all about, et cetera, but there is one issue that is really of huge concern as far as the AFEB. And if I could just leave you this copy of this letter, et cetera. That we would like to do hopefully over the next month or six weeks.

DR. ALEXANDER: Good idea.

DR. LAFORCE: As a two-tiered strategy.

One, getting a document out and about and then secondly trying to follow it up with personal

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visits at least at that level.

DR. GARDNER: I don't know how much of
the data you have seen from this year, but there
have been outbreaks on almost every single recruit
base in all services.

DR. LAFORCE: Correct.

DR. GARDNER: Up to 20 percent hospitalizations.

DR. LAFORCE: Right.

Up to 50 to 60 percent DR. GARDNER: infection rates. And to 40 to 50 percent up outpatient visits 70 and up to 60 to percent infection rates. I mean, this is just ubiquitous.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ted Woodward might help you. It seems to me you would want to briefly the reasons why the vaccine was developed. There were some deaths, high morbidity and Ted could -- we still don't have a therapy and we will have thus. And then another question or comment would be would we link this in any way -- it seems to me the morbidity and mortality that we are dealing with from respiratory disease is the leading -- would we link this in any way to influenza and the importance of preparedness

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in influenza. I think that is an attention getter and I would try to put those two together as the immunologic approaches to prevention of things that certainly will result in mortality if they hit.

DR. LAFORCE: Other points? Yes, Joel?

DR. GAYDOS: I had a point that was brought up yesterday which I think is important. The military training camps have been used as a place where all these people came together these pathogens were spread from person to person and then overflowed into the community. An example was meningococcal disease at Fort Worth and Fort Worth was forced to close. Dr. Gray presented yesterday the concern that there was spillover of 7 from adenovirus Type Great Lakes into the civilian community. We do know that the adenovirus installation. off the And certainly problem major in adenoviruses are а our immunocompromised population, which is very large in this country. And I think that the situation as far as the military being the source of morbidity and mortality in the civilian population something that should be avoided also.

DR. LAFORCE: Okay. Fair enough. I will move for some satisfaction. Are there any -- I

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1	want to spend a minute or two also exploring what
2	Stan brought up in discussions that
3	COL. DINIEGA: Are we in Executive
4	Session?
5	DR. LAFORCE: I am sorry.
6	COL. DINIEGA: I have managed to
7	continue directly
8	DR. LAFORCE: What have I have I done
9	something wrong?
10	COL. DINIEGA: No, no. I just wanted to
11	know if we have gotten the work done for the
12	subcommittee.
13	DR. LAFORCE: The subcommittee work I
14	think is done.
15	DR. OSTROFF: The only other question
16	that I would raise is whether anything more needs
17	to be said vis-a-vis the influenza vaccine
18	situation. Because it is clear that the various
19	services are taking different approaches, i.e.,
20	what the Marines are doing in terms of
21	prioritizing.
22	CAPT SCHOR: That will be a Naval we
23	just have to put our feedback in through the Navy.
24	It is likely to be a minority opinion. It probably
25	is. I don't know how that will sort out. There

1	will probably be just one DoD approach.
2	COL. DINIEGA: There is a DoD policy on
3	prioritization that is currently being set up by
4	health affairs to all of the services.
5	CDR LUDWIG: The signatures are due back
6	this Friday.
7	COL. DINIEGA: Right. And then the plan
8	was when the comments come in, they will be
9	incorporated as felt appropriate by the group that
10	drafted the
11	DR. LAFORCE: You see, that is a good
12	point in that no specific question was addressed to
13	the Board in terms of influenza vaccine. We know
14	on the basis of the presentations that there are
15	likely major differences in terms of how vaccines
16	are going to be distributed. Obviously it is going
17	to be a lot different as far as the Marines are
18	concerned versus the U.S. Army.
19	CAPT SCHOR: No, sir. No, that is
20	incorrect. It is central decision making on this.
21	That is the way it will be.
22	DR. LAFORCE: There will be a single
23	policy?
24	CAPT SCHOR: Yes.
25	DR. LAFORCE: It will not be service

specific?

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CAPT SCHOR: Correct.

DR. LAFORCE: Fine.

COL. DINIEGA: Dod, you know, has decided to come up with a DoD policy. And it was agreed upon within the JPMPWG, the Joint Preventive Medicine Policy Working Group, to do that. And as it is staffed, when a difference of opinion occurs, they are allowed to have their say and usually the majority rules. Or the Secretary -- the Health Affairs Secretary rules.

LAFORCE: would DR. I say that President οf the AFEB, Ι am actually а chagrined that no input was asked from the AFEB. And it is not necessarily in terms of a codifying statement, but certainly participation in the discussions would have been all that would have been requested. It could have been Pierce or it could have been Steve or myself or anyone from the Board. And I would have thought that would have been sort of something pretty basic and something pretty reasonable. I mean, there is а lot of expertise amongst the group. I mean, that is why we all have gray hair.

CDR LUDWIG: May I just offer, in our

1 discussions that took place, we had frequent 2 discussions and it was more or less an emergency basis. I mean, we worked on this the same way that 3 I am sure that CDC and others. And the executives 4 5 -- I mean, Colonel Diniega was there. COL. DINIEGA: I'll take the hit. 6 7 mean, I --8 DR. LAFORCE: All it would have taken is 9 one phone call. Some of us wanted that to 10 CAPT SCHOR: 11 happen. 12 DR. LAFORCE: And that one phone call --13 that is all I am saying. If this sort of comes up again -- again, it is not a question of dictating. 14 15 It is not a question of saying this, this, this and 16 this. It is just a question of trying to help and 17 to be involved. Because it is important to us. 18 is important enough to discuss a lot of this 19 stuff, it sure in the heck is important enough to 20 discuss something -- and also because οf its 21 importance as a public health problem, there is 22 actually a fair amount of competence. I mean, I am 23 talking about pretty senior competence within that arena. That is all. 24

DR. BERG: I have two points building on

that. One, it seems to me that all of the people around here wearing the uniform kind of have an obligation to represent the Board and offer it up in situations like this. It is a two-way communication. And I conceive of this in the sense that you work for the Board also.

The other thing that I do not remember when I was in the Navy is this proliferation of groups such as the one that you are on on sexual transmission. I wonder if we could get some sort of presentation or listing of all these groups, who they are and what they do.

COL. DINIEGA: I may as well say it here, there are a multitude of work groups that are looking at prevention arenas, and there is an effort, as we heard form Lynn Pollin in a previous this umbrella committee, meeting, to have Prevention Safety and Health Promotion Council, to be the arena through which a lot of these verified formalized groups work through. And result, the Injury and Occupational Illness Prevention Committee is a part of the PSHPC, and they have already presented their action plan to us for us to review and we have made recommendations. So the STD --

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DR. BERG: When you say us, you mean the AFEB?

The AFEB. The COL. DINIEGA: STD Prevention Committee, of which Commander Ludwig is a member and they have asked me to be a member -and the reason they asked the Executive Secretary for the AFEB is because of the FACA rules. If they named one of you as a member to represent the AFEB, it would then become a federal advisory committee. However, I was told by a committee man, if they named the Executive Secretary as the committee member, then whoever accompanies me is okay. doesn't turn into a federal advisory committee.

DR. ALEXANDER: I have been --

COL. DINIEGA: Right. And Dr. Alexander is a member of the STD Prevention Committee. And that group will present at our next meeting. And they are working on an action plan. So the AFEB will get to see that. There are several other groups that will present. The Suicide Prevention Committee, which is not yet under the PSHPC but will be soon -- probably at the next quarterly meeting. And then the Put Prevention Into Practice Employmentation Committee is a formal committee of the PSHPC. And they will present at the next

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1	meeting also. The Ergonomics Work Group belongs to
2	a different Secretary, and we have already opened
3	up the dialogue with them. There is a proliferation
4	of groups, but the PSHPC is beginning to scavenge
5	and survey what is going on there and try to bring
6	under the umbrella the main things. There is
7	another group that Captain Schor and I are very
8	interested in, and it is the Abuse by Military
9	Personnel of Herbal Supplements. And that group is
10	trying to get themselves together to get the
11	military specific information to be able to present
12	the problem to the PSHPC more formally, so that
13	they can get a charter and really work and fund
14	that.
15	So there are a multitude of committees.
16	Sue Baker used to go to the Injury and
17	Occupational Illness Prevention Committee. So I am
18	looking for volunteers who would like to go. We
19	fund the official reporting to these.
20	DR. BERG: I would just like a list of
21	the groups and what the acronyms are and what their
22	charters are, just to sort of keep me up to date.
23	UNKNOWN SPEAKER: If you are looking for
24	six or seven new members, the acronyms

DR. LAFORCE: You know what I think we

2	to be an item for discussion. We will just sort of
3	set aside some time and then get because during
4	the course of the discussions, particularly if
5	there are two ore three committee activities that
6	are of real interest to the AFEB, we can go back
7	and then identify. If individuals are interested,
8	by heavens it just makes it enriches the
9	activity such that it is just not every three
10	months and then hello/good-bye. It really is a
11	commitment that the Board has to not only the
12	military but to general public health.
13	COL. DINIEGA: But the difficulty I have
14	encountered is that for the most part most members
15	of the Board between meetings have very limited
16	time.
17	DR. LANDRIGEN: Ben, do you have a
18	counterpart over there? What I am leading up to
19	COL. DINIEGA: For those committees?
20	DR. LANDRIGEN: For the PSHPC.
21	COL. DINIEGA: Not a counterpart. There
22	is a coordinator at Health Affairs that coordinates
23	
24	DR. LANDRIGEN: I am wondering if that
25	person could be invited to come here.

should do is at the next meeting -- that is going

1	COL. DINIEGA: That person did speak at
2	the last meeting.
3	DR. LANDRIGEN: Regularly is what I am
4	thinking of.
5	DR. OSTROFF: Can I make at least one
6	request in relation to the influenza? Just that at
7	the next meeting, which would be sometime in
8	February and we will obviously see the impact of
9	whatever the policy is going to be, if the
10	preventive medicine updates can include the flu
11	situation.
12	DR. LAFORCE: Hopefully the quiet flu
13	situation.
14	DR. BERG: The issue of the different
15	services distributing the flu vaccine in different
16	ways seems to have been settled. There is going to
17	be a uniform policy. But we also discussed a
18	little bit about the possible use of anti-viral
19	medicine. Is that something that anyone wants to
20	bring up?
21	DR. LAFORCE: Or at least the
22	stockpiling. The stockpiling. And this is where
23	the discussions at the committee level could be.
24	Because some of us have a fair amount of experience
25	within those. And during the discussions I had with

Ken yesterday and also with Ben at my place last night -- again, the whole issue wasn't you ought But the idea was, gee maybe if you get a little bit more information and you actually look the toxicities or the lack of toxicities, at. particularly with the newer agents, it may broaden and make easier control mechanisms for flu rather than just a single vaccine related strategy. That all. Ιt just of passing was was а way information on that you may want to take advantage of. That is all. It was no more than that.

DR. OSTROFF: And it may well be that if the policy comes out that they are going to prioritize retirees or the high risk individuals, that that may actually impact the willingness of the different services to possibly stockpile antivirals for use for their front line troops.

DR. LAFORCE: Yes?

I just would like to echo DR. ENGLER: flu. you said about As an immunology consultant, I was only privy to an e-mail discussion, which I don't know where it went, but it was with PM folks on board. And I raised a Because again, the preventive number of concerns. medicine view of the world is an important view of

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the world, but it is not the only view of the
world. And there is not adequate clinical problem
representation. And the policies that come out from
the policy perspective or the people who generate
them are, oh well, it is done. We then sit there
trying to actually figure out what it means. And
when I raise the issue of we don't know what we are
getting some of us what I was told from the
depot is whoever has their order in first will get
their vaccine. And so if that is true, what is the
ethical consideration that if Joe Shmo got his
order in late or that sort of thing that is what
I was sent on e-mail. I am just telling you. And I
said how can we market the military healthcare
system with the words we are just giving it to the
readiness force first and then we are going to
abandon everybody else. I would suggest that the
public who thinks we are here to protect them and
to be there for will look at some little old lady
with heart disease and lung disease or some little
guy in the trenches will interpret that policy of
we only have to immunize the military because we
ran out. That is tough. Go elsewhere. What
obligation do we have to create connectivity to
other sources? How are we going to help the

1	totally under-researched clinical side of the house
2	manage the potential fog. I am praying and we are
3	all praying very hard that this is a quiet flu
4	season and that those viruses aren't real
5	malignant. But there is no discussion. It is like,
6	here is the policy and here is your thing and you
7	should be happy.
8	LTC NEVILLE: All of those things were
9	discussed.
10	DR. ENGLER: What?
11	LTC NEVILLE: All of those things were
12	discussed.
13	DR. ENGLER: But I would ask you I
14	asked the ID consultant if he was involved. I
15	asked if the people who are concerned about immuno-
16	compromised patients were involved. I don't think
17	so. I was pretty much told by e-mail it is the
18	soldier first and any concerns you have about
19	patients and issues, well that is just secondary
20	and not our problem.
21	LTC NEVILLE: That didn't come through.
22	DR. ENGLER: I understand. But what I am
23	telling you is the frustration. I want to tell the
24	Board that there is a whole group in the clinical
25	community that is as frustrated as you are.

1	Because it is not a balanced discussion. It is not
2	a health to the trenches. The policies are
3	frequently very hard to dissect. And if you think
4	it is going to be uniformly applied, you are living
5	in a delusional world. Because it won't. Because
6	I'll bet you the understanding of the trench
7	workers will be, well this must mean active duty.
8	How do we handle is asthma
9	you know, there is asthma. The Academy of
10	Allergy and Immunology is recommending flu for
11	asthma. Where do the pregnant women come in? I
12	mean, it is really bad that we are in a year where
13	we have expanded the recommendation for the flu.
14	When they just say high risk and military
15	operational, well within the high risk let's think
16	the worst, that the company fails. How do we
17	stratify within there?
18	CDR LUDWIG: We did stratify high risk.
19	And we basically followed the CDC recommendations
20	on those things.
21	DR. ENGLER: Well, even though
22	CDR LUDWIG: We can't do anything but
23	offer a policy. That is all we are empowered to do.
24	DR. ENGLER: I understand. The draft I
25	have seen leaves some room for

1 CDR LUDWIG: It was old. That was old. 2 Next are discussion DR. LAFORCE: Okay. 3 items. We are done with the 4 COL DINIEGA: 5 comments on anything that was presented, right? 6 DR. LAFORCE: Yes, pretty much. 7 Okay. I don't think we COL. DINIEGA: 8 need to say anything more about Anthrax at this 9 point. I do have -- may I? 10 DR. LAFORCE: Yes, sir. 11 COL. DINIEGA: A couple of updates. At 12 the last meeting, the whole issue of the BW threats from the Joint Chiefs was discussed extensively as 13 we all remember. And the NBC operations office at 14 15 that point had promised regular updates on the 16 medical risk analysis to the Board. And I said just 17 give me something and I will pass it on to the 18 They want the Board to know that they have Board. 19 contracted for someone to help with the medical 20 risk analysis. What they are looking at is setting 21 up work groups to take a look at the criteria for 22 doing the medical risk analysis. They want it in 23 black and white. There is an oversight group that

DR. LAFORCE: Good.

they want somebody from the AFEB to be on.

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COL. DINIEGA: And so they are putting as Executive Secretary. So I will need down somebody to do that with me. And then the other issue is that I asked personally to be on one of the work groups. So I probably will be on the work not so much representing the AFEB, But making sure that always doing that anyway. this is considered -the medical since risk analysis I consider one of the things we have been to work for for many years now in trying I just want to make sure that the arena, groups are on the right track.

There were four recommendations from the last meeting. The squalene paper you heard from Lieutenant Riddle. They haven't heard back from Congress on any of the things. The other was the Ergonomic Work Group Plan, which we have talked about, and then the BW threat review, which there are no new threats.

But the other significant recommendation that came from the Board was the antibiotics that could be useful against biowarfare agents. That went over to Health Affairs. They reviewed it. Colonel Takafuji is now gone and somebody else is going to inherit that. But that is going to help

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1	them quite a bit in looking at things that would be
2	useful. Stockpiling is a very sensitive issue now
3	with everybody. Because if it is not FDA approved,
4	then why are you stockpiling it.
5	DR. OSTROFF: There is one change in the
6	letter that was put together. That is that Cipro
7	is now approved. And I think it is just approved
8	for treatment. It is not approved
9	DR. LAFORCE: No it is approved for
10	prophylaxis.
11	DR. OSTROFF: For prophylaxis as well?
12	DR. LAFORCE: Yes, that is a prophylaxis
13	approval.
14	COL. DINIEGA: Yes.
15	DR. LAFORCE: That was a huge
16	COL. DINIEGA: That was very big.
17	DR. BERG: Was it approved for
18	prophylaxis or prophylaxis after exposure.
19	DR. LAFORCE: That is it.
20	COL. DINIEGA: Post-exposure
21	prophylaxis. And Anthrax. And I think not in kids.
22	And that is on the Board recommendations. So I am
23	sure whoever is going to take Colonel Takafuji's
24	place is going to inherit that.
25	MAJ BALOUGH: Sir, can I say something

Τ.	on that?
2	COL. DINIEGA: Sure.
3	MAJ BALOUGH: The service came back with
4	quantities and that was sent out to different
5	CINCS. And CENTCOM has come back and said that is
6	enough. They have got what they needed.
7	COL. DINIEGA: As far as what?
8	MAJ BALOUGH: The antibiotics.
9	COL. DINIEGA: Oh, antibiotics against
10	the BW agents?
11	MAJ BALOUGH: Right. They said they have
12	that is sufficient for what they've got or what
13	they need. We are still waiting for PACOM to come
14	back.
15	DR. BERG: When you say that is
16	sufficient, you mean they have got enough supplies
17	on hand?
18	MAJ BALOUGH: For what they feel they
19	need.
20	DR. BERG: For what they feel that they
21	need.
22	COL. DINIEGA: In June, the preventive
23	medicine officers met to select new members to the
24	Board. There are six new members that are in the
25	appointive process. They are Environmental and

Occupational Health, Dr. Dennis Shanahan.

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DR. BERG: Did you say where he is coming from?

COL. DINIEGA: Shanahan is ex-military who is aerospace medicine and his expertise is in injuries. Carl Zwerling, for those of you who know, declined because of previous commitments to the IOM and CDC committees. That is the competition for appointments. Doug Campbell, occupational medicine position, North Carolina Health Department and now in private practice was nominated by Stan. And he accepted the appointment to the Board. And then the alternate was John Herbold, who previously at Health Affairs, and his name came up with the HIV-AIDS thing in the middle. He was a program analyst at Health Affairs. But he is a vet who has been involved in environmental health quite a bit and infectious diseases. He was the first alternate. So when Zwerling turned it down, we went to him and he has accepted. So Shanahan, Campbell and Herbold.

DR. BERG: Campbell is ex-EIS?

COL. DINIEGA: Yes, he is ex-EIS and ex-Marine. For Health Promotion and Maintenance, there were two selected. Dr. Brownson declined.

Т	Dr. Kumanyika declined. We needed two. The first
2	alternate, Dr. Patrick, who is at University of San
3	Diego
4	DR. BERG: Kevin Patrick?
5	COL. DINIEGA: Kevin Patrick, right. He
6	accepted and will be on the Board. But we need to
7	select another person. Disease Control, Bob Shope
8	at the University of Texas at Galveston accepted.
9	Bill Moore, who is a retired infectious disease
10	physician and two-star in the Army accepted. He is
11	the State Epidemiologist in Tennessee, accepted.
12	So with the loss of Dr. Music who is on the
13	Occupational Environmental Health Committee and Dr.
14	Tsai, who is Infectious Disease, and the need for
15	one more in Health Promotion, we have to select
16	the PM officers have to select three additional
17	members to keep the membership at 20. What
18	normally happens is that about two-thirds can show
19	up at a meeting at any one time, that is the norm.
20	So that would give us 15 members at a meeting.
21	DR. GARDNER: Has Ken Holmes ever been a
22	member of this committee?
23	COL. DINIEGA: Who?
24	DR. GARDNER: Ken Holmes in Sexually
25	Transmitted Diseases and AIDS?

COL. DINIEGA: I don't think so.

DR. GARDNER: He would probably like to do it.

There were a total of six COL. DINIEGA: left. from the year before and 11 over new submissions for this year. Wе need recommendations. What is needed is, one, an updated CV, a letter of recommendation -- it can be very an e-mail type from whoever is doing the nominations on why they think the person would be a good fit. If it comes from somebody in active duty, the nomination does, then it has to go to the service preventive medicine officer who liaison to the Board, just to make sure that they know about it and they agree. Because they will have to be looking at the nominations. And whoever nominates, please explain the Board. If you need help from me, I will do that. But explain to whoever you are nominating what the Board is about at least and what the time commitment is. don't want is people who we never see at meetings. That is the main thing. The appointment is two The PM officers ask that reappointments not be automatic and it be run by them first. And I usually talk to Dr. LaForce too. The main concern

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is how active were they with the Board. Because I am sure the credentials are good. But it is a matter of how active they are with the Board. So it is a two-year term, maximum of four years. Any questions on that? two-year terms. The appointment process -- they should be ready for the next Board meeting. Now unlike the last February meeting, their appointments came through a day or two after our meeting. We had all the orders ready Hopefully this time we have to go before then. more lead time. Part of the appointment packet now for approval for appointment is the OGE-450, which is the financial disclosure statement. That will be a requirement for the appointment packet forward. And the legal office will review. concern is only who the employer is. That is the main concern.

Since I am talking about the OGE-450's, that will be an annual requirement for all Board it will requirement for members. So be а appointment packet and it will be an annual requirement. The other big requirement for Board all know, is the security members, as you clearance. You have to be cleared for a security clearance up to secret, and that usually entails a

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1	lot of answering of questions like where were you
2	the last 10 years and all your employers and all
3	your residences.
4	DR. ALEXANDER: There was some kind of
5	question about my security clearance, which was
6	ironic because I had a top secret before. But
7	anyway, the woman who called, I have called she
8	said there is a question and I need an answer. I
9	have called her back I bet a dozen times.
10	COL. DINIEGA: Do you know who that was?
11	Jenny Ellington?
12	DR. ALEXANDER: Yes.
13	COL. DINIEGA: Okay. She has been in and
14	out of her office because of the summer. People
15	take vacation. She is there now.
16	DR. ALEXANDER: I have left her so many
17	messages.
18	COL. DINIEGA: Send me an e-mail do
19	it by e-mail.
20	DR. ALEXANDER: I don't have her e-mail
21	address.
22	COL. DINIEGA: I will send you her e-
23	mail address. Remind me. I will put it down here,
24	but just remind me.
25	DR. ALEXANDER: Okay.

COL. DINIEGA: We are going to be down in the office for probably the next two days. They are painting and changing carpets. So we have to pack up and move out. I have to be packed up and moved out by 5:00 tomorrow. But I will put it down here.

DR. ALEXANDER: I don't want to be declared negligent when I have really been trying.

COL. DINIEGA: And you know, the only time you need that clearance is when we do the BW threat review. Now for the Gulf War illness, they needed it because they had a lot of meetings about what to do with the IND products and how to go So the security clearances and about using it. then the OGE-450's. Please fill them out. They are not asking for amounts. They just want to know You don't have to list all what your holdings are. the stocks and bonds in your mutual fund, you just name the mutual fund. But they want a listing of individual stocks also. And they are not asking for how much do you make. They want to know where the income comes from and whatever you owe close My name will be submitted to Health Affairs as to. a nomination to move over to Dave Trump's position as the preventive medicine officer. It was not my

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doing. They had asked me previously and I said wait until next summer. And then when Dr. Clinton took over from Dr. Sue Bailey, he went directly to the Surgeon Generals and said I need somebody and I need them right away. And General Peak, whom I have worked for on four different occasions, put my name in the ring. The high visibility was that I got all kinds of e-mails from people who work for him, including General Scully, who is the deputy or the Acting Surgeon General now. He came and talked to me about taking that position. It is hard to say no.

So depending on how fast they want me, which they want me as soon as possible -- as soon as that job is firmed up, we will put out a nomination for a new Executive Secretary for the Board. And the process, for your information, is that we ask the services to submit nominations the same as the Board members. They send in their CV's their official military records and and they officer record briefs. And then they go over to the -- and they get an endorsement from either the SG's or some general officer. And if there is more than one name submitted, it becomes a competitive job application. Then they are all interviewed.

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Right now Health Operations and Policy, the Board falls under that section of Health Affairs. Dr. Clinton used to be and Dr. Claypole used to be the head of that. Now the acting is Mr. Ron Richards, who is an SES. He will select from among the candidates. As soon as that occurs, then I'll be able to move, unless they can make other temporary coverage arrangements.

DR. LAFORCE: Actually from our standpoint, you are going to be a huge loss.

I do want to thank the COL. DINIEGA: Board -- all the current and previous Board members and the members of the JPMPWG and all the liaison Because I think all the liaison officers officers. have made this job much easier to do. I bang on their desks for presentations and questions and I for feedback on their desks the They never kick me out of recommendations. meeting and they let me say what I want to say. We have a very mutual agreement. And all of the officers are really excellent. And then the Board for their participation, but especially members those that have taken the lead on issues, Stan Music being a very good example. Stan -- you know, Stan -- Dennis Parrota beforehand. Dr. Poland,

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Greg Polland, who wants to be a Marine still yet.
Steve Ostroff, who despite being the czar, manages
to find time to send me drafts, et cetera. And of
course, Dr. LaForce. Dr. LaForce and I talk at
least three times a week whenever he is in town. I
never try to find him in Africa. But when he is in
town, we are always talking. But, you know, I
wanted this job. General Peak wrote my
recommendation for this job. So how can I tell him
I won't go do what he wants me to do. And it is
something I always wanted to do since I first made
a presentation in 1982 about an outbreak of febrile
illness in a battalion of soldiers who went to
Panama to do jungle operations training center and
came back with fevers that we thought were malaria.
It turned out to be leptospirosis. That is my
favorite disease. My first presentation to the
Board was on that. Dr. Woodward remembers a lot of
that. He has a fabulous memory. It was just so
nice hearing him and seeing him again today. Ever
since then, that has been one of my goals is to get
the Executive Secretary position. It did come
true. I have had my shot at it and it is time to
move on. So I just want to thank everybody.

DR. LAFORCE: Your last act is to get

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COL. DINIEGA: We will try. That
reminds me, we will try. There are two ways to do
that. I really need the calendars of non-available
dates so that we can set the meeting date. We need
three months between meetings and we are sort of
stuck with the BW threat review in May. So if you
back it up, the meeting can't occur later than mid-
February. Last year we had it at the end of
February. We still managed to work the BW meeting.

So Ι have the people working recommendations. I have your name and I know your e-mail and your phone number. And I usually do business by e-mail. So I am set. Get your travel It is a little crucial this time settlements in. because of the end of the year. The Army goes on fiscal year, so September 30th. We need to get all of those travel settlements in before the end of the month. Otherwise, they will have to carry over And if Congress hasn't passed the for next year. budget, they go with continuing resolutions. questions of me?

DR. LAFORCE: Other questions or statements or issues?

DR. HAYWOOD: I want to raise a point

1	for the next meeting. I had hoped there would be
2	time in this Executive Session to bring up the
3	general question of the role of the Board. But I
4	would suggest that be on the agenda for the next
5	meeting. Rather than dealing with how the Board
6	operates on specific issues, its overall role in
7	the background of Dr. Woodward's presentation
8	today.
9	DR. LAFORCE: Yes. And I would also like
10	to maybe set forth what Stan brought up in terms of
11	codifying a relationship, particularly with
12	military medicine. I thought that was a terrific
13	idea. Maybe one of the things that I will do from
14	now until the next meeting is actually see about
15	working either with Ben or somebody to actually
16	meet and chat with the editor the senior editor.
17	Just to introduce the Board and just to sit down
18	and chat.
19	COL. DINIEGA: Just a reminder. The
20	AMSAS Military Medicine is a private organization.
21	DR. LAFORCE: Right.
22	COL. DINIEGA: The CDC MMWR is a CDC
23	publication. The Army has an equivalent of the
24	MSMR, the Medical Surveillance Monthly Report. You

know, AMSAS now is the Defense Medical Surveillance

1 System or Agency or whatever they want to call it. 2 I think they were having plans to have a 3 Defense Medical Surveillance Monthly Report of some So if you were to do it in parallel. 4 5 DR. LAFORCE: Perfect. That would be where it 6 COL. DINIEGA: 7 would be. DR. GARDNER: We could have a liaison 8 9 member coming to these meetings. Along with Stan being the liaison member from the pharmaceutical 10 industry. We need him back. 11 12 DR. ALEXANDER: Could we actually put that on the agenda for next time? 13 I would like 14 some discussion on the role with industry, one at 15 the personal level because I work really closely 16 with industry, yet I don't feel branded. But two, I see phenomenal opportunities for us to interface 17 18 with industry, and there must be ways to design 19 such a relationship where you would maintain that 20 federal protection that is so desired by the Army 21 legal folks. 22 the same time And yet at 23 opportunities for us to interface that would be 24 advantageous to us and the problems that we are

challenged with. So if we could put that on the

1 agenda. It is more than a ten-minute discussion. 2 With all due respect, I DR. HAYWOOD: 3 think that is a subtopic of the broad issue. DR. LAFORCE: But it would involve -- in 4 5 order to plan for that, we would have to make sure that somebody from legal -- do you see what I mean? 6 7 In order for this to be a discussion, we would want 8 to have some --9 COL. DINIEGA: Legal has offered to come to the Board about the conflict of 10 talk 11 interest issues. Now just a reminder, there is a 12 big difference between the DoD statute and other statutes on conflict of interest. And the biggest 13 difference is in many of the military statutes or 14 15 regulations or whatever, it has the terminology 16 "the appearance of." And that is very different from the civilian sector, where it has to be yes or 17 18 no. The military for a lot of things -- sexual misconduct, fraternization, et cetera -- has the 19 20 appearance of. And appearance of is not determined 21 by the people inside. It is the people outside. So 22 the minute somebody on the outside says it looks 23 like, then you are stuck. 24 DR. LAFORCE: Yes, Bob? 25 DR. BERG: Would it be possible to get a

1	DoD lawyer to address it? Because one of the
2	things is I deal with our State Attorney General
3	all the time and one of the things I have learned
4	as have my fellow health directors, when you are
5	dealing with lawyers, you have to be very careful
6	how you phrase the question. Because their native
7	answer is no. So you need to ask is there a way we
8	can do this. And with the Army judge advocates
9	having already weighed in with it, I think if we
10	invite him what we are likely to get is the
11	standard conflict of interest answer.
12	COL. DINIEGA: There is one glitch to
13	that. The AFEB the executive agency for the
14	AFEB is the Army. And as I found out with Dr.
15	Parrota and I don't know if Stan was there, but I
16	had my hand slapped when we closed a meeting on the
17	advice of the DoD lawyer. DoD said you can close
18	the meeting. It turns out that I was supposed to go
19	to the Army lawyers and the Army lawyer's decision
20	was there was no reason for closing the meeting.
21	DR. ALEXANDER: Can we have both of
22	them?
23	COL. DINIEGA: Well, I don't want to
24	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If there is
25	anything worse than one lawyer, it is two lawyers.

1	COL. DINIEGA: The bottom line is the
2	Army runs is the administrative power.
3	DR. BERG: Apropos of distributing the
4	recommendations, all of the Surgeons Generals have
5	Websites. So that would be another good place to
6	put the recommendations from the Board.
7	COL. DINIEGA: We do have a Website. Dr.
8	Trump was handling that for us. It is
9	tricare.osd.mil/afeb. And since Dr. Trump left, we
10	haven't updated. But we plan right now it has a
11	little blurb on the Board, a listing of members
12	that has got to be updated. And then it has the
13	last year's recommendations the previous
14	recommendations aren't on there yet. We just have
15	to make the connection to get it on there.
16	DR. LAFORCE: 29 minutes after. We
17	finished a minute early.
18	COL. DINIEGA: Who is interested in the
19	WRAIR tours still yet?
20	(Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the meeting
21	was concluded.)
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